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INTRODUCTION
On March 9, 1994, Frank Ferris was indicted on one count of pos-
session with intent to distribute cocaine base, or crack-cocaine
("crack"), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. He was subsequently con-
victed and sentenced to five years imprisonment.' This conviction
and sentence was based on a drug sale to an undercover police officer
of twenty dollars worth of crack, an amount small enough to have
been wrapped in a gum wrapper.2 This crime, although prosecuted
in federal court, could have been prosecuted in state court under ap-
plicable state law.3 What motivated federal prosecutors to charge Mr.
Ferris in federal court? Perhaps he was part of a larger interstate or
international cocaine ring that implicated substantial federal inter-
ests. Perhaps he was a recidivist whom prosecutors believed deserved
more severe federal penalties. There are a number of rational moti-
vations for prosecuting Mr. Ferris in federal court. Irrational and
even unconstitutional motivations, however, are distinct possibilities
t B.A. 1995, J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Pennsylvania. This Comment is
dedicated to my parents, Janice and Jack Heller. Without their support and encour-
agement I would not have had, nor have been able to take advantage of, the academic
opportunities afforded to me that have culminated in this Comment. I would also like
to thank the University of Pennsylvania for seven years of the finest education, and the
Law School faculty and administration in particular who have made my legal educa-
tion the most rewarding experience of my life.
See United States v. Ferris, No. 94-5783, 1995 WL 417606, at *1 (4th Cir. July 6,
1995).
2 See id.
3 SeeVA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248 (Michie 1996).
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as well. After all, why burden the federal courts with the prosecution
of a mere twenty dollar sale of crack?
The story of the federal prosecution of Mr. Ferris indicates a po-
tential problem of federal law enforcement in general, and federal
drug law enforcement in particular. Relatively insignificant crimes
that affect purely local interests potentially rise to the level of federal
crimes. This is a recent phenomenon in American criminal law.5
Throughout much of American history, the regulation of criminal
conduct was principally the province of the governments of the sev-
eral states. This local control of criminal law was, in large part, due to
the recognized limited powers of the federal government, a govern-
ment restrained in its authority by the enumerated powers granted to
6it in the Constitution. Policy concerns also dictated local control of
the criminal justice system, as state governments were viewed as the
political bodies best suited for protecting citizens from the primarily
local problem of crime.7
As in other areas of the law, however, the changes that came with
the modern era forever altered the landscape of criminal law, as the
federal government began to encroach upon what had been a bastion
of state sovereignty.8 Massive economic expansion forced the federal
government to play a larger role in American society, and the arena
4 Mr. Ferris never challenged the decision to prosecute him in federal court based
on unconstitutional motives. Because of the small quantity of drugs involved, how-
ever, his case is a perfect example of the potential for prosecutorial abuse that is the
focus of this Comment. See infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98
W. VA. L. REV. 789, 789 (1996) ("Jurisdiction over criminal enforcement has been,
throughout the history of American law, primarily local."); Sam J. Ervin, III, The Feder-
alization of State Crimes: Some Observations and Reflections, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 761, 761
(1996) (noting that "Congress seems intent on 'federalizing' more and more criminal
offenses that have been historically tried in state courts").
6 See Ashdown, supra note 5, at 790 ("The United States Constitution granted rela-
tively little criminal law enforcement authority to the newly created federal govern-
ment .... ).
SeeJamie S. Gorelick & Harry Litman, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Federalization
Debate, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 968 (1995) (noting that some critics of the increasing
trend in federalizing criminal law are principally concerned with recent crime legisla-
tion inappropriately infringing upon federalism interests by taking "matters tradition-
ally of local concern out of the hands of local officials").8° .
For a more complete historical summary of the federal government's role in
criminal law, see Sara Sun Beale, Reporter's Draft for the Working Group on Principles to Use
When Considering the Federalization of Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS UJ. 1277, 1278-94
(1995).
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of criminal law was no exception. 9 The post-New Deal expansive in-
terpretation of the Commerce Clause rendered the constitutional
barrier to an increased role for the federal government largely nonex-
istent.10 As "the crime problem" invaded the national consciousness
to an unprecedented degree, especially in the past quarter-century,
the "federalization" of crime has continued on an even more massive
scale."
9 See Ashdown, supra note 5, at 790 ("[I]t was not until mobility and vast resources
led to geographic and economic expansion that federal influence [in criminal law]
began to be felt.").
Although on its face, the Commerce Clause grants Congress the limited power
"[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the modern interpretation of this lan-
guage is that the federal government may regulate any activity, even if purely local in
nature, as long as "it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and
this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been
defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.'" Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). This
"affecting commerce" rationale has provided constitutional support for countless fed-
eral criminal statutes. See, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977)
(holding that the firearm possession provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 were constitutionally permissible exercises of congressional
powers under the Commerce Clause); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)
(same holding with respect to the "loan shark" provisions of the Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act of 1964 given the fact that "[e]xtortionate credit transactions ... may in
the judgment of Congress affect interstate commerce"). But seeUnited States v. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which
made it a federal crime to possess a firearm within designated school zones, exceeded
congressional powers pursuant to the Commerce Clause).
Although Lopez suggests a possible narrowing of congressional Commerce Clause
powers, the Court's decision can be interpreted as resting on the fact that the Act con-
tained no congressional findings regarding the actual effects on interstate commerce
of gun possession in schools, and thus the decision should not be viewed as a broad
constitutional attack on federal criminal legislation. See id. at 1631-32 ("We
agree.., that Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the
substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce. But to the extent that
congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such
substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here." (citation omit-
ted)). But see Ashdown, supra note 5, at 808 (arguing that Lopez "is clearly a substan-
tive, principle-based decision, and not a narrow procedural holding based on the lack
of congressional findings"). Professor Ashdown notes, however, that subsequent to
the Lopez decision, the lower federal courts have been "terribly stingy" in applying the
Supreme Court's decision. Id. at 809 & n.1 13 (listing 34 reported lower federal court
decisions that refused to apply the Lopez holding and only four reported decisions that
have applied the Court's alleged limitation on congressional Commerce Clause
power). This may suggest that Lopez, at least until the Supreme Court clarifies the
scope of its holding, does indeed rest on narrow procedural grounds.
Prior to the passage of the 1994 Crime Bill, estimates placed the number of fed-
eral crimes at over 3,000. See Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Pinciples
to Define the Proper Limits for Federal CriminalJurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 980 &
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Most of the federal expansion into the criminal law arena has not
been at the expense of state criminal law. Federal criminal law,
rather than preempting state law, largely supplements preexisting
state prohibitions.'2 Thus, conduct that constitutes a federal crime in
many cases "permit[s] dual jurisdiction by both federal and state
authorities. "1s The most visible example of this concurrent jurisdic-
tion, both in terms of public awareness and the sheer number of cases
prosecuted, is in the area of illegal drugs. 4 An accused drug offender
is subject to federal prosecution, state prosecution, or both, for the
same criminal incident." Because of the wide disparity in sentencing
between federal and state drug statutes, the decision whether to
prosecute federally takes on crucial importance. Simply stated, when
a U.S. Attorney decides to prosecute a drug offender in federal court,
rather than allow a state district attorney to prosecute the case in state
court, the offender will ordinarily be subject to more severe punish-
ment than similarly situated offenders who are prosecuted in state
court. I
n.10 (1995) (citing Hon. RogerJ. Miner, Crime and Punishment in the Federal Courts, 43
SYRACUSE L. REv. 681, 681 (1992)). This expansion of federal criminal law can be di-
rectly attributed to the modern-day political climate of "law-and-order, crime control,
and generally getting tough on crime." Ashdown, supra note 5, at 806.
For example, most of the new federal offenses introduced into the United States
Code in the past decade, including in the recently passed Crime Bill, prohibit such
conduct as theft of major artwork, failure to pay child support, and drive-by shootings.
These types of conduct are all the subjects of state criminal law in addition to federal
criminal law. See, e.g, 18 U.S.C. § 668 (1994) (theft of major artwork); 18 U.S.C. §§ 228
& 3563(b)(1) (1994) (failure to pay child support); 18 U.S.C. § 36 (1994) (drive-by
shootings); see also, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516.110 (Michie 1990) (theft of art-
work); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4345 (West 1991) (failure to pay child support);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1209 (West Supp. 1996) (drive-by shootings).
13 Beale, supra note 11, at 981.
14 Cf Sara Sun Beale, Federal Criminal Caseload/Scope of Federal CriminalJurisdiction,
in REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON WORKLOAD at 7, in 1 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM.,
WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMM. REPORTS JULY 1, 1990 (opining that "[t]he sheer
number of drug prosecutions poses a threat to the federal courts' ability to perform
their constitutional role [as mainly civil tribunals]").
is The potential constitutional violations that occur when a defendant is prose-
cuted in both state and federal court for the same conduct is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
16 For example, a defendant convicted of possession of 50 grams of crack is subject
to a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years imprisonment under applicable federal
law. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (iii) (1994). The same defendant is subject to a
three-year mandatory minimum sentence if prosecuted in the state courts of Califor-
nia or Pennsylvania. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11351.5 (West 1991); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7508(a) (2) (ii) (West Supp. 1996). This sentencing disparity is ex-
acerbated in a number of states because of the availability of parole in many state pe-
nal systems, unlike in the federal system.
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Concurrent jurisdiction due to the federalization of criminal law
introduces into the criminal justice system a potential for prosecuto-
rial abuse that was not an area of concern when crime was primarily a
locally regulated phenomenon. 7 Prior to the widespread presence of
the federal government in the area of criminal law, prosecutorial
abuse with regard to the charging decision occurred only when a
prosecutor charged a person with a crime despite having no probable
cause to believe that person had committed the crime.' 8 Currently,
prosecutorial abuse can occur, even if a prosecutor has the requisite
probable cause, when a federal prosecutor decides to prosecute a case
in federal court based on such constitutionally impermissible motives
such as the defendant's race, religion or ethnicity, rather than allow a
state prosecutor to proceed with a state prosecution.'9
17 This potential abuse of prosecutorial power can be partially ameliorated by the
limiting of federal encroachment into substantive criminal law, a distinct possibility
following the Lopez decision. See supra note 10. This Comment focuses on a particular
constitutional abuse made possible by the federalization of criminal law, as well as its
coinciding grant of concurrentjurisdiction between states and the federal government
that is most relevant in the area of drug offenses. It therefore should be noted that
given the obvious interstate and international scope of the drug trade, the Court's de-
cision in Lopez, whether seen as a narrow procedural holding or a broad substantive
limitation on congressional Commerce Clause powers, is not a solution to the consti-
tutional problem made possible by such concurrent jurisdiction. See Ashdown, supra
note 5, at 810 n.115 ("It is unlikely that certain federal statutes will be susceptible to a
Commerce Clause challenge: such as the comprehensive drug laws ... P); see also
United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a Lopez-based Com-
merce Clause challenge to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act); United States v. Salmiento, 898 F. Supp. 45 (D.P.R. 1995) (rejecting a Lopez-based
Commerce Clause challenge to the Drug Free School Zones Act), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Zorrilla, 93 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Gonzalez, 893 F. Supp. 935
(S.D. Cal. 1995) (same holding for distribution of a controlled substance); United
States v. Garcia-Salazar, 891 F. Supp. 568 (D. Kan. 1995) (same holding as Salmiento
relating to the Drug Free School Zones Act). Thus, existing Commerce Clause juris-
prudence does not suggest a solution to the constitutional concerns that are the focus
of this Comment.
18 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("[S]o long as the prosecu-
tor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring be-
fore a grandjury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.").
19 When conduct is both a federal and a state crime, a federal prosecutor's charg-
ing decision is a two-part process. First, she must determine if there is probable cause
to believe the accused committed the crime defined by the federal statute. This first
part of the charging decisionmaking process has long been a potential area of prose-
cutorial abuse when impermissible criteria such as race enter into the charging proc-
ess. See infra Part I. Second, she must determine if the particular conduct warrants a
federal prosecution, with the understanding that deciding not to pursue a federal
prosecution will not mean that the accused will go unpunished given the existence of
state law that makes the same conduct a crime. This second part of the charging deci-
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The doctrine of prosecutorial discretion, which presumes that a
prosecutor's decisionmaking process is constitutionally valid, is a
20principle with many legitimate and persuasive justifications. In
United States v. Armstrong,' the Supreme Court recently applied this
long-standing doctrine2 to the concurrent jurisdiction decisionmak-
ing process a federal prosecutor confronts when an act constitutes
both a federal and state crime.23 The Armstrong Court reversed a dis-
trict court's discovery order that would have compelled the U.S. At-
torney's Office for the Central District of California to disclose its cri-
teria for bringing a drug prosecution federally. The Court found that
such charging decisions fall within recognized prosecutorial discre-
tion and that only a high threshold of evidence that suggests a consti-
tutional violation based on selective prosecution would permit such
24discovery.
This Comment will argue that the traditional justifications for
granting federal prosecutors almost unchecked discretion in making
their charging decisions fail to outweigh the important constitutional
rights at issue in situations such as the one the Court confronted in
Armstrong. Therefore, the need exists for meaningful judicial review
sionmaking process brings with it the same potential for prosecutorial abuse as the
first part, that is, by possibly injecting impermissible criteria into the process. See Greg
Hollon, Note, After the Federalization Binge: A Civil Liberties Hangover, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 499, 504 (1996) (discussing the potential for prosecutorial abuse by U.S. At-
torneys that is made possible when a crime is both a federal and state offense, and not-
ing that the "degree to which disparate federal and state sentences are unjust may de-
pend on the motivations underlying a U.S. [A]ttorney's decision to prosecute a
specific defendant federally").
See infra Part II.
21 116S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
For more exhaustive general discussions of the doctrine of prosecutorial discre-
tion, see KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARYJUsTIcE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY, 188-
214 (1969); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1521 (1981).
In Armstrong, the defendant, Christopher Lee Armstrong, claimed that he was
being prosecuted in federal court rather than state court based on his race. (There
were four defendants involved in the Armstrong litigation, but this Comment, for sim-
plicity, will only refer to the named defendant/respondent, Mr. Armstrong.) In fed-
eral court, Armstrong faced a sentence of 55 years to life, though in state court, he
would have been subject to a sentence of three to nine years in prison. See Leading
Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 135, 166 (1996) (citing Brief for Respondents Shelton
Auntwan Martin, Aaron Hampton, Christopher Lee Armstrong, and Freddie Mack at
3, Armstrong (No. 95-157), available in 1996 WL 17111).
24 See infra Part I.C for a more detailed discussion of the facts and the Court's
holding in Armstrong as well as the constitutional doctrine of selective prosecution
generally.
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of the federal charging decision.2 Part I of this Comment will trace
the constitutional principle of selective prosecution embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. It will demon-
strate that the Supreme Court's decision in Armstrong has rendered
this doctrine largely moot in an area that is especially susceptible to
such constitutional violations. Part II discusses the doctrine of prose-
cutorial discretion and its commonly stated rationales. It will exam-
ine the applicability of the long-standing principle of prosecutorial
discretion to the concurrent jurisdiction context brought on by the
federalization of criminal law. This Part will argue that there is a
need for meaningful judicial review of prosecutorial decisionmaking.
This need stems from the failure of the policies that support broad
prosecutorial discretion to justify potential infringement on a defen-
dant's constitutional right to enjoy equal protection of the laws. Fi-
nally, Part III of this Comment supplies a working model for such
meaningful judicial review. This model is premised on the argument
that a prosecutor, as a fiduciary of the people, has a judicially en-
forceable duty in certain situations to answer a defendant's accusa-
tions of unconstitutional selective prosecution through discovery
mechanisms.
I. THE CONSTITImONAL DoCmNE OF SELECTIVE PROSECUTION
A. Yick Wo v. Hopkins and the Emergence of the
Selective Prosecution Doctrine
In the seminal case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,26 the Supreme Court es-
tablished the general constitutional principle that the selective en-
forcement of a facially neutral statute may violate the Equal Protec-
25 In the context of this Comment, the federal charging decision relates to the
second part of a federal prosecutor's decisionmaking process with respect to charging.
See supra note 19. Meaningful judicial review occurs when a judge has sufficient evi-
dence to render a decision on a defendant's selective prosecution claim. The level of
evidence needed for meaningful judicial review will depend on the relative merits of
the particular claim, but will, at times, require that prosecutors make disclosures rele-
vant to the selective prosecution claim through a district court's inherent discovery
powers. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1492 (Stevens,J, dissenting) (recognizing a district
judge's inherent power to order discovery); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee's
note (1974) (stating that Rule 16 is "not intended to limit the judge's discretion to or-
der broader discovery in appropriate cases"); see also United States v. AlJibori, 90 F.3d
22, 25 (2d Cir. 1996) (suggesting that the Armstrong holding "seriously undermines"
prior case law holding that the decision to order discovery "lies largely in the trial
jude's discretion" (citation omitted)).
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Yick Wo was a challenge
to a San Francisco municipal ordinance that required the consent of
the board of supervisors in order for a laundry to be operated in
wooden buildings.28 The evidence demonstrated that while such con-
sent had been freely given to eighty non-Chinese applicants, two-
hundred similarly situated Chinese applicants had been denied the
necessary consent by the board of supervisors.29 In finding that the
ordinance so administered violated the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court stated:
[T]he facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively
against a particular class of persons as to warrant and require the con-
clusion, that, whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as
adopted, they are applied by the public authorities charged with their
administration, and thus representing the State itself, with a mind so
unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of
that equal protection of the laws which is secured to the petitioners, as
to all other persons, by the broad and benign provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Though
the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discrimination
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the
denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. 0
The Court in Yick Wo made it clear that a statute constitutional on its
face can be rendered unconstitutional upon a showing that the public
officials charged with the administration of the statute discriminated
against a distinct class of people in enforcing the statute.
27 118 U.S. at 373-74. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part that
"[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Although there is no explicit corresponding
prohibition on the federal government in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as containing an "equal
protection component" that subjects the federal government to the same equal pro-
tection standards as the Fourteenth Amendment does to the states. See Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (subjecting racial segregation in the District of Co-
lumbia school system to the same constitutional standards applied in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638
n.2 (1975) ("This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has
always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
28 See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 368.
2 See id, at 374.
so Id. at 373-74.
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Two key issues remained unresolved by the Yick Wo decision: (1)
when such unconstitutional discrimination has occurred; that is, what
classes of people are protected from unequal administration of the
laws?; and (2) what proof is needed to demonstrate such unconstitu-
tional discrimination?
B. The Evolution of the Selective Prosecution Doctrine Since Yick Wo
The Supreme Court addressed the first of these issues in Oyler v.
Boles." ' As in Yick Wo, the petitioner in Oyler alleged that a facially
neutral recidivist statute was being selectively enforced against him in
a manner that violated the Equal Protection Clause. 2 Specifically,
Oyler claimed that his selection for prosecution under the recidivist
statute violated his equal protection rights.33 Unlike Yick Wo, however,
the petitioner in Oyler did not claim that he was selected due to his
affiliation with a certain class of people. He merely was complaining
that he was selected for prosecution under the recidivist statute while
others were not. In rejecting his equal protection argument, Justice
Clark declared:
[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in it-
self a federal constitutional violation. Even though the statistics in this
case might imply a policy of selective enforcement, it was not stated that
the selection was deliberately based upon an uniustifiable standard such
as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.
Together, Yick Wo and Oyler stand for the proposition that selec-
tive enforcement of a facially neutral statute based on unjustifiable
standards, such as race, constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. At the same time, these deci-
sions recognize that some selectivity in enforcement of criminal laws
is permissible and even necessary. These cases did not, however, ad-
dress what evidence is required to prove such impermissible selective
368 U.S. 448 (1962).
32 In Oyler, the petitioner, having been previously convicted of three felonies pun-
ishable by imprisonment, was sentenced to life in prison pursuant to a West Virginia
recidivist statute. See id. at 450. The petitioner claimed that the state's application of
the recidivist statute to his case amounted to unconstitutional selective prosecution.
In support of his claim, he cited statistical data demonstrating that the recidivist stat-
ute's mandatory life sentence had been sought in his particular case but had not been
sought by state prosecutors in 904 other cases in West Virginia in which it could have
been sought. See id. at 455.
33see i&
34 Id. at 456.
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prosecution-the second major issue left unresolved in Yick Wo. Both
Yick Wo and Oyler seem to suggest that statistical evidence may suffice
in certain situations to prove unconstitutional selective enforcement
of a statute. 5 This approach, nonetheless, is not the one taken by the
Court since its decisions in Yick Wo and Oyler.
In Washington v. Davism the Court held that in order for a facially
neutral statute to violate the Equal Protection Clause, there must not
only be discriminatory effects stemming from the application of the
statute, but also a corresponding intent to discriminate.3 7 The Court
reasoned:
The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the
basis of race.... But our cases have not embraced the proposition that a
law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disproportionate impact.
Statistics of discriminatory enforcement of laws, seemingly suffi-
cient to prove an equal protection violation in Yick Wo, were deemed
necessary but not sufficient in Davis."9 Although not considered to-
35 In fact, the Court's decision in Yick Wo seems to rest entirely on statistical evi-
dence of selective enforcement of the municipal ordinance against Chinese laundry
operators:
It appears that both petitioners have complied with every requisite, deemed
by the law or by the public officers charged with its administration, necessary
for the protection of... the public health. No reason whatever, except the
will of the supervisors, is assigned why they should not be permitted to carry
on... their harmless and useful occupation .... And while this consent of
the supervisors is withheld from them and from two hundred others who have
also petitioned, all of whom happen to be Chinese subjects, eighty others, not
Chinese subjects, are permitted to carry on the same business under similar
conditions. The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it is
shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for it exists ex-
cept hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and
which in the eye of the law is notjustified.
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374.
36 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
37 See id at 239. This case dealt with an equal protection challenge to a qualifying
test given to applicants for police officer positions with the District of Columbia Met-
ropolitan Police Department. The petitioners were black applicants who had failed
the test and were claiming that the test violated the equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment. The applicants' claim was based on statistics that demonstrated
that a higher percentage of black applicants failed the test than white applicants. No
allegation was made that the test purposefully discriminated against black applicants.
See id at 235.
8 Id.
39 See id. at 242.
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tally irrelevant in determining whether discriminatory purpose exists
in a particular case, evidence of discriminatory effects was deemed
"not the sole touchstone of... invidious racial discrimination forbid-
den by the Constitution."0
In Wayte v. United States,4' the Court applied equal protection
standards specifically to a claim of selective prosecution. The peti-
tioner in Wayte had refused to register with the Selective Service Sys-
tem as required by federal law.42 The Government adopted an en-
forcement policy of prosecuting only those nonregistrants who were
known to the Government, either because they notified the Govern-
ment of their refusal to register or others had notified the Govern-
ment.43 The petitioner was a vocal opponent of the Selective Service
System" and, because the Government was therefore made aware of
his failure to register, he was prosecuted.4 He argued that the Gov-
ernment's enforcement policy violated the equal protection compo-
nent of the Fifth Amendment. He alleged this violation because the
policy selected for prosecution those offenders who had exercised
their First Amendment rights by vocally stating their opposition to the
Selective Service System, an acknowledged impermissible enforce-
ment criterion."
The Wayte Court noted that "[i] t is appropriate to judge selective
prosecution claims according to ordinary equal protection stan-
dards.... Under our prior cases, these standards require petitioner to
show both.., a discriminatory effect and.., a discriminatory pur-
pose. " 17 Because the petitioner had only alleged discriminatory ef-
fects, his selective prosecution claim was rejected. 4 Assuming there is
no overt discriminatory classification present, therefore, the Court
requires a defendant to inquire into a prosecutor's subjective motiva-
tions for her charging decisions in order to prove unconstitutional
selective prosecution.
40 M
41 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
42 See id. at 600-01.
4 See id. at 603.
44 See id.at 601.
4 See i&. at 603.
46 See i. at 604-05.
47 id. at 608.
48 See i. at 609 ("All petitioner has shown here is that those eventually prose-
cuted.., reported themselves as having violated the law. He has not shown that the
enforcement policy selected nonregistrants for prosecution on the basis of their
speech.").
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The second major issue left unanswered by the Court in Yick Wo--
namely, what evidence is necessary in proving unconstitutional selec-
tive prosecution-was resolved in Wayte. The Court, by applying
normal equal protection standards previously announced in Davis, 9
required the defendant to prove that his selection for prosecution was
based on purposeful, unjustifiable, discriminatory motives. Of
course, proving subjective motivations is an extremely difficult task,
and the question remained how a defendant could demonstrate pur-
poseful discrimination beyond a mere statistical showing of discrimi-
natory effects." In United States v. Armstrong, the defendant attempted
to overcome this evidentiary obstacle in proving discriminatory racial
motivation by seeking evidence from the U.S. Attorney's Office
through discovery mechanisms.5 '
C. United States v. Armstrong and the Discovery Debate
Entitling a defendant to discovery that could lead to evidence of
discriminatory motivation by a prosecutor in her decisionmaking
process would be a useful tool for overcoming this evidentiary obsta-
cle described in the previous section. In Wade v. United States,52 the
Court indicated that a defendant must make a "substantial threshold
showing" of improper prosecutorial motivations in order to be enti-
tled to discovery or an evidentiary hearing on the issue of selective
prosecution."' The Court, however, did not indicate what level of evi-
dence could meet this "substantial threshold showing" since Wade
49 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
Members of the Court, as well as other federal judges, have recognized the diffi-
culty of proving a person's subjective motivations in other contexts relating to dis-
crimination, most notably in the context of employment discrimination. See Price Wa-
terhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
the entire purpose of the shifting burdens of proof applicable in employment dis-
crimination cases "is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional dis-
crimination is hard to come by"); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d
1061, 1071 (3d Cir. 1996) ("The distinct method of proof in employment discrimina-
tion cases, relying on presumptions and shifting burdens of articulation and produc-
tion, arose out of the Supreme Court's recognition that direct evidence of an em-
ployer's motivation will often be unavailable or difficult to acquire.").
See1l6S. Ct. 1480, 1483 (1996).
52 504 U.S. 181 (1992). The petitioner in Wade argued that the prosecutor's re-
fusal to file a motion to reduce petitioner's sentence due to his substantial assistance
in the investigation of other cases violated equal protection standards. See id. at 183.
The Court noted that a claim that a prosecutor failed to file a motion to reduce a de-
fendant's sentence should be treated the same as any claim challenging the constitu-
tional validity of a prosecutor's actions. See id at 185.
33 Id. at 186.
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had failed to allege any improper prosecutorial motives.4 The Arm-
strong case directly presented the issue of what constitutes a
"substantial threshold showing" necessary for discovery, as Armstrong
alleged the presence of discriminatory effects and motivation on the
part of federal prosecutors.5
The Court in Armstrong reversed a discovery order that had been
issued by the District Court for the Central District of California and
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit en banc. This order would have com-
pelled the district's U.S. Attorney's Office to disclose relevant infor-
mation regarding Armstrong's claim of selective prosecution.5 Arm-
strong argued that the decision to prosecute his crack and firearm
offenses in federal court, rather than in a California state court, was
based on his race-a violation of the equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment.5 7 In support of this allegation, Armstrong pre-
sented statistical and anecdotal evidence that tended to demonstrate
that while the defendants were black in an extremely disproportion-
ate number of crack cases brought in federal courts, nonblacks were
disproportionately being prosecuted in state court, and thus subject
to less severe sentences.8 In denying the government's motion for
reconsideration of her discovery order, Judge Marshall stated her rea-
sons for granting discovery on Armstrong's selective prosecution
claim, clearly believing the statistical evidence presented warranted a
response from the U.S. Attorney:
54 See id.
55 See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1483 (noting that the defendants had alleged "that
they were selected for federal prosecution because they are black").
Specifically, the districtjudge,Judge Marshall, had ordered the Government to:
(1) provide a list of all cases from the prior three years in which the govern-
ment charged both cocaine base [crack] offenses and firearms offenses; (2)
identify the race of the defendants in those cases; (3) identify whether state,
federal, or joint law enforcement authorities investigated each case; and (4)
explain the criteria used by the U.S. Attorney's Office for deciding whether to
bring cocaine base cases to the federal court.
United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir. 1995). Judge Marshall's dis-
covery order was reversed by a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit, see United States
v. Armstrong, 21 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1994), before being affirmed by the Ninth Circuit
en banc, see 48 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995), and then reversed by the Supreme Court in
an 8-1 decision withJustice Stevens dissenting, see 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
57 See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1483, 1486.
See i& at 1483. Specifically, Armstrong presented evidence obtained from the
Federal Public Defenders' Office that showed that of the 24 crack and firearm cases
the Office had closed in 1991, all 24 defendants were black. Armstrong also presented
anecdotal evidence in the form of an affidavit from a private criminal defense attorney
that stated that, in his experience, many nonblacks were prosecuted for the same
crack offenses in California state court rather than in federal court. See id-
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"The statistical data provided by the Defendant raises a question about
the motivation of the Government which could be satisfied by the gov-
ernment disclosing its criteria... for bringing this case and others like it
in Federal court. Without this criteria the statistical data is evidence and
does suggest that the decisions to prosecute in Federal court could be
motivated by race. Without expert testimony, this Court cannot con-
clude that the defendants' evidence is explained by social phenomena
[as the Government has suggested]." 59
The Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for an
eight-Justice majority, reversed Judge Marshall's discovery order. The
Court held that the required threshold for discovery relating to a de-
fendant's selective prosecution claim, alluded to in Wade, is "a credi-
ble showing of different treatment of similarly situated persons."6
The Court first rejected Armstrong's argument that Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16 entitled him to discovery, an argument that
had not been made in the lower courts.r Chief Justice Rehnquist
then discussed the need to erect a "significant barrier to the litigation
of insubstantial [selective prosecution] claims."62
The Court found that the policy of affording prosecutors broad
discretion in their decisionmaking processes justified the erection of
the significant barrier. Although recognizing that prosecutorial dis-
59 Armstrong, 48 F.3d at 1512 (quoting Judge Marshall's oral decision denying the
Government's motion for reconsideration of her previous discovery order).
60 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1489. Because Armstrong could not supply evidence
demonstrating that similarly situated whites were treated differently than blacks by
federal prosecutors based on their race, the Court held thatJudge Marshall's discovery
order was inappropriate. Responding to the Ninth Circuit's fear that, absent discov-
ery, defendants face heavy evidentiary obstacles in proving possible meritorious selec-
tive prosecution claims, see 48 F.3d at 1514, the Court stated that, had Armstrong's se-
lective prosecution claim been well founded, "it should not have been an insuperable
task to prove that persons of other races were being treated differently than respon-
dents." Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1489.
61 See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16(a) (1) (C) provides in pertinent part:
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the defendant to
inspect and copy... books, papers, documents ... or copies or portions
thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of the govern-
ment, and which are material to the preparation of the defendant's defense
or are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the
trial ....
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a) (1) (C). The Court held this rule inapplicable to a defendant's
claim of selective prosecution because such a claim is not a defense to the govern-
ment's "case-in-chief." Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485. After rejecting this Rule 16 argu-
ment, the Court turned its attention to a district judge's inherent authority in order-
ing discovery beyond instances in which Rule 16 requires discovery.
62 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486.
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cretion is subject to constitutional constraints such as the equal pro-
tection component of the Fifth Amendment,' the Court proceeded
from a "presumption that a prosecutor has not violated equal protec-
tion [standards]."64 Judicial deference to prosecutorial discretion, the
Court reasoned, is warranted by a number of factors, including: (1)
avoiding unnecessary delay in criminal proceedings; (2) preventing
the chilling of law enforcement that would occur if prosecutors' mo-
tives and decisionmaking were subject to outside inquiry by the courts
on a regular basis; (3) preventing the undermining of prosecutorial
effectiveness by revealing prosecutorial strategies; and (4) avoiding
the encroachment by the judicial branch of government on the ex-
ecutive branch's constitutional function, namely the enforcement of
the laws of the land.6n
The Court's decision in Armstrong, by erecting what Chief Justice
Rehnquist himself described as a "significant barrier" to proving se-
lective prosecution claims,66 has effectively mooted an important con-
stitutional protection recognized over one hundred years ago in Yick
Wo. This "significant barrier," is a prototypical Catch-22: Equal pro-
tection is violated only when a prosecutor purposefully enforces a fa-
cially neutral statute against a person based on an impermissible fac-
tor such as race, but a defendant can only obtain evidence needed to
prove such purposeful discrimination by establishing a substantial
threshold showing of purposeful discrimination. In other words, a
defendant can only prove that she was selected for prosecution in
federal court rather than state court based on her race with evidence
that will normally be in the possession of federal prosecutors. This
evidence, however, is not discoverable because of the presumption of
constitutional validity of discretionary prosecutorial decisionmaking.67
See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
64 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486.
See id. For a more detailed examination of the commonly stated rationales for
granting prosecutors broad discretion, see discussion infra Part ILA.
66 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486.
67This Catch-22 created by the Armstrong decision has been described by one
source as "signal[ing] a disquieting insensitivity to the appearance of injustice." Lead-
ing Cases, supra note 23, at 170; see also David Cole, A Catch-22 Ruling on Selective Prosecu-
tion Law: A High Court Decision in an L.A. Appeal All but Guarantees that Racial Bias in
Federal Crack Cocaine Cases Will Be Unprovable L.A. TIMffS, May 26, 1996, at M5 ("In ef-
fect, one must prove one's claim without access to the very evidence necessary to prove
one's claim. Under this rule, the only time a selective prosecution claim might suc-
ceed would be if a U.S. [Aittorey were to announce an official policy of targeting
only blacks for prosecution. Beyond that, the defense of selective prosecution is a
myth.").
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Moreover, the Court has created this Catch-22 at a time when the
nation's war on drugs is apparently having a disproportionately puni-
tive effect on black Americans, most notably in the area of crack
prosecutions in federal court."' Even if the disproportionate effects
on black Americans have legitimate explanations, the refusal of fed-
eral prosecutors to provide evidence that would support such expla-
nations leaves the perception of discrimination in the minds of
many.6 This perception alone warrants the meaningful judicial re-
view of prosecutorial discretion argued for in this Comment. If this
meaningful review demonstrates that federal prosecutors are not in-
jecting race into their decisionmaking processes, the concerns of
68 These disproportionate punitive effects are demonstrated by the following statis-
tics. It should be stressed that these statistics are not meant to indict federal prosecu-
tors as being racially motivated. They merely demonstrate that the perceptions that ra-
cial bias exists in prosecutorial decisionmaking are grounded on the well-documented
disproportionate impact of federal drug enforcement efforts relating to crack prosecu-
tions. In the Central District of California (where the Armstrong case originated) be-
tween January 1992 and March 1995, only one federal crack defendant out of 149 was
white. See United States v. Turner, 901 F. Supp. 1491, 1496 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (citing "a
more recent and comprehensive prosecution study than was provided in [the Arn-
strong] case"). In a comprehensive study of both federal and state charging practices
in Los Angeles, Richard Berk and Alec Campbell concluded that "African-Americans
in general and African-Americans who are charged with offenses involving cocaine
base in particular are at a greater risk of being charged with federal crimes than
other... offenders." Richard Berk & Alec Campbell, Preliminary Data on Race and
Crack Charging Practices in Los Angeles, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 36, 38 (1993). This con-
clusion was based on the following data for individuals arrested for the sale of crack
between 1990 and 1992: 222 crack defendants in state prosecutions were white com-
pared to 4410 black defendants; meanwhile, not a single defendant in a federal crack
prosecution was white, whereas 36 of the 43 crack defendants in federal court were
black. See id. at 37. Because the total number of federal crack prosecutions is small,
Berk and Campbell note that it is impossible to make strong conclusions on the basis
of the available data-"[f]ar more information would be required." Id. at 38; see also
Drew S. Days III, Race and the Federal CriminalJustice System: A Look at the Issue of Selective
Prosecution, 48 ME. L. REV. 181, 186-87, 189 (1996) (listing additional statistics that
demonstrate the disproportionate impact that crack prosecutions have on blacks and
arguing that "serious and concerted efforts to locate explanations for nation-wide fed-
eral prosecution figures that appear, at a superficial level, to be out of line from a ra-
cial 9erspective" are necessary and ongoing).
See, e.g., Cole, supra note 67, at M5 ("There is little doubt that the black commu-
nity is suspicious.... The black community views the criminal justice system with deep-
seated and widespread distrust. That distrust has its roots in a long history of racial
discrimination, but those roots are only replenished by decisions like Armstrong, which
make it impossible even to ask the question whether a criminal prosecution was ra-
cially motivated."); David G. Savage, High Court Rejects Racial Challenge to L.A. 'Crack'
Case LA- TIMES, May 14, 1996, at Al ("'I would think in a democratic society, where
there appears evidence of possible racial discrimination, we would want to get to the
bottom of it' .... " (quoting George Kendall, a lawyer for the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund)).
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those who believe federal prosecutors are acting in a discriminatory
fashion would be alleviated. Equally significant, federal prosecutors
themselves would be able to feel vindicated.70 The potential for consti-
tutional abuse due to the increased federalization of criminal law re-
quires a reexamination of the justifications for the broad grant of
prosecutorial discretion that served as the basis for the Armstrong
Court's mandate of judicial deference to prosecutorial decisionmak-
ing.
II. THEJUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN THE
CHARGING DECISION
As discussed in Part I.C, the Supreme Court's decision in Arm-
strong was based largely on the commonly stated justifications for al-
lowing for broad prosecutorial discretion.7 ' Nowhere does this grant
of broad prosecutorial discretion bestow any more power on prosecu-
tors than in the decision whether to charge a person with a certain
crime. One-time U.S. Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, who later
became a Supreme Court Justice, described this awesome power and
its potential for abuse in the following manner:
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than
any other person in America. His discretion is tremendous.... If the
prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that he can choose
his defendants.... It is in this realm-in which the prosecutor picks
some person whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some
group of unpopular persons and then looks for an offense, that the
greatest danger of abuse of prosecutorial power lies. It is here that law
enforcement becomes personal.7
70 See Leading Cases, supra note 23, at 174 (listing several race-neutral factors that
would explain the disproportionate statistics regarding federal drug prosecutions, but
arguing that even if there are race-neutral reasons for the disparate treatment of
blacks exemplified by these statistics, "both the public and the prosecutors' office
would benefit from disclosure [like the district court ordered in Armstrong]").
71 See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486 (1996).
72 Robert H. Jackson, 24J. AM. JUD. Soc. 18-19 (1940), quoted in DAVIS, supra note
22, at 190; see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) ("There is no
doubt that the breadth of discretion that our country's legal system vests in prosecut-
ing attorneys carries with it the potential for both individual and institutional abuse.");
Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative Law for
Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 476-78 (1976) (describing the
prosecutor as "the single most powerful figure in the administration of criminal jus-
tice").
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Yet courts are extremely reluctant to review prosecutorial discre-
tion for the types of abuses alluded to by Attorney General Jackson. s
Instead, prosecutorial decisionmaking is cloaked with a presumption
of validity, making a prosecutor's charging decision "essentially unre-
viewable." 74 Given the increased potential for prosecutorial abuse
stemming from the overlapping criminal jurisdiction of the state and
federal courts, there is a need to reexamine a doctrine that leaves a
federal prosecutor's charging decision virtually unchecked.
The commonly stated rationales for bestowing virtually unlimited
discretion to prosecutors in making charging decisions, and the ra-
tionales cited by the Court in Armstrong, can be divided into four
categories: (1) promoting prosecutorial and judicial economy and
avoiding delay; (2) preventing the chilling of law enforcement; (3)
avoiding the undermining of prosecutorial effectiveness; and (4) ad-
hering to the constitutional principle of separation of powers and as-
sessing the relative competence of the executive and judicial branches
of government regarding the prosecutorial function. 5 These justifi-
cations have led the Court to adopt the virtually irrebuttable pre-
sumption that a prosecutor is acting within constitutional limits. As
long as there is "probable cause to believe that the accused commit-
ted an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, gen-
erally rests entirely in his discretion."76 This discretion is cloaked in a
73 Illustrative of this judicial reluctance to interfere with prosecutorial discretion
despite the potential for abuse described by Attorney General Jackson is the fact that,
before being reversed by the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Armstrong
was the first reported federal case since Yick Wo in which a court overturned a prosecu-
tor's discretionary charging decision based on racial selective prosecution. See Leading
Cases, supra note 23, at 171.
74 Vorenberg, supra note 22, at 1522; see also infra note 76 and accompanying text.
Professor Vorenberg notes that while prosecutorial discretion remains broad, other
actors' discretionary powers in the criminal justice system have been limited. He cites
the limitations on the powers of magistrates to set bail, judges to set sentences, and
correctional officers to control inmates. See Vorenberg, supra note 22, at 1522. With
the establishment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, federal judges retain even
less discretion in sentencing than they did at the time Professor Vorenberg wrote,
making the prosecutor's charging decision that much more important. See United
States v. Williams, 746 F. Supp. 1076, 1082 (D. Utah 1990) ("Congress, through the
minimum mandatory sentencing statutes and the sentencing guidelines, has severely
curtailed the discretion of the court at sentencing, but no similar limitation has been
placed on the exercise of discretion of police officers or prosecutors. This situation
results in de facto sentencing by police and prosecutors."), reuld in part, 963 F.2d 1337
(10th Cir. 1992) (affirming the conviction but remanding for sentencing).
See supra text accompanying note 65.
76 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364.
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"'presumption of regularity [that] supports'.., prosecutorial deci-
sions and 'in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts
presume that [prosecutors] have properly discharged their official
duties.'" 7 Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Armstrong
established a self-described "significant barrier" to obtaining such
clear and convincing evidence through discovery.7 8 Yet when the
Court stated the aforementioned justifications for prosecutorial dis-
cretion, it merely listed them in a cursory fashion without inquiring
into their merits. Prosecutorial discretion thus, is treated as gospel,
resulting in a doctrine that prevails and prospers through inertia
rather than through sound policy.79  Given the statistics regarding
race and federal crack prosecutions, and more importantly the per-
ceptions of racial bias that stem from these statistics," nowhere is a
careful reexamination of the prosecutorial discretion doctrine more
warranted than in the context of race-based selective prosecution
claims.
The remainder of this Part will examine the four commonly
stated rationales for prosecutorial discretion that served as the touch-
stone for the Court's decision in Armstrong. It will demonstrate that
these rationales are unpersuasive in situations exemplified by Arm-
strong, namely, when a person can be charged for the same offense in
either state or federal court. The rationales, although admittedly
based upon legitimate governmental interests, fail to justify the de-
gree of discretion granted to prosecutors because they fail to balance
Armstrong; 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486 (1996) (quoting United States v. Chemical
Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)).
78 M The Court felt that such a "significant barrier" was necessary to prevent "the
litigation of insubstantial claims." Id. For a critique of this argument, see infra Part
HALL
Professor Davis is especially critical of the inability of courts, and even many
commentators, to question the soundness of bestowing upon our nation's prosecutors
almost unlimited discretion:
[Tihe habit of assuming that of course the prosecutor's discretion must be un-
controlled is so deeply embedded that the usual implied response to ques-
tions as to whether the prosecuting power can be confined or structured or
checked is that the questioner must be totally without understanding. Inabil-
ity of those who are responsible for administering the system to answer the
most elementary questions as to the reasons behind the system is itself a rea-
son to reexamine.
DAvis, supra note 22, at 191. This need to reexamine the doctrine of prosecutorial
discretion is even more pressing today with the increased potential for prosecutorial
abuse that is caused by the trend toward increased federalization of criminal law. See
supa notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 68-70.
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these legitimate interests against the important constitutional guaran-
tee of equal protection of the laws.
A. The Commonly Stated Rationales for Prosecutorial Discretion
1. Prosecutorial andJudicial Economy and the Avoidance of Delay
a. The Justification
Prosecutorial and judicial economy are the most practical ration-
ales for the broad grant of prosecutorial discretion discussed in Arm-
strong. Allowing frequent judicial review of prosecutors' charging de-
cisions strains the limited resources of both the courts and
prosecutors' offices in two ways. First, criminal statutes tend to define
criminal conduct in broad terms. If prosecutors were compelled to
proceed against a large percentage of offenders, prosecutorial and
judicial resources would be strained even more so than they are to-
day.8' Second, allowing judicial review of prosecutors' discretionary
authority introduces the likelihood of collateral litigation that would
further strain prosecutorial and judicial resources and cause lengthy
delays in criminal proceedings.82 Given the already overwhelmed
federal court docket, the argument goes, prosecutorial discretion is
necessary to help curb the ever-increasing strain on the federal
courts, especially the burgeoning criminal docket.8s
81 See Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedur4 135
U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1368-69 n.10 (1987) (discussing the barriers to judicial review of
the decision whether to prosecute); Vorenberg, supra note 22, at 1548 (summarizing
the justification for prosecutorial discretion based on limited prosecutorial and judi-
cial resources).
82 See Days, supra note 68, at 185 (arguing that close judicial scrutiny through dis-
covery on selective prosecution claims is "extremely burdensome and time-
consuming"); Reiss, supra note 81, at 1368-69 n.10 ("Another defense is added. An-
other proceeding, a hearing to explore the defendant's allegations, is necessary....
Another clearly guilty defendant goes free." (citation omitted)); Developments in the
La--Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1523 (1988) [hereinafter
Race and the Criminal Process] (stating that "practical concerns of efficiency militate
against substantial judicial review of the prosecutorial charging decision").
83 See Beale, supra note 11, at 984, 985 (noting that between 1980 and 1992 the
number of criminal cases filed in federal courts increased by 70%, from 27,968 to
47,472, and stating that by 1992, 38 of the 92 federal districts devoted over half of their
trial dockets to criminal cases, with some district judges being unable to try a single
civil case for a year or more).
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b. The Response
Preserving prosecutorial and judicial economy and avoiding delay
in criminal proceedings are legitimate concerns when introducing
any possible avenue for frivolous, collateral litigation, including a se-
lective prosecution claim. There is a need, however, to account for
these legitimate concerns without neglecting claims that are possibly
meritorious. The Court in Armstrong seems to have ignored the pos-
sibility that a selective prosecution claim can be meritorious, despite
the perceptions of racial bias in law enforcement generally, and the
statistics that suggest race may be motivating federal prosecutorial de-
cisionmaking specifically.4 By placing a "significant barrier" that
must be overcome in order to prove selective prosecution, the Court
has succumbed to "a fear of too much justice" in the name of prose-
cutorial and judicial economy."
Any balance between the desire to avoid unnecessary strains on
prosecutorial and judicial economy and the need to review govern-
mental actions for possible abuses of discretionary power must con-
sider not only the legitimate goal of preventing frivolous claims, but
See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. Moreover, race may be motivating
prosecutorial decisionmaking for reasons other than conscious racism. Commenta-
tors have argued persuasively that racism is present both at a conscious and uncon-
scious level:
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism
has played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared experience,
we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach signifi-
cance to an individual's race and induce negative feelings and opinions about
nonwhites. To the extent that this cultural belief system has influenced all of
us, we are all racists. At the same time, most of us are unaware of our ra-
cism.... In other words, a large part of the behavior that produces racial dis-
crimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.
Charles R. Lawrence III, The 1d, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (footnote omitted); see also Race and the Crimi-
nal Process, supra note 82, at 1523 ("Given the vast extent of uncontrolled prosecutorial
discretion, racial bias can enter the charging process in many ways. It can occur as the
result of conscious prosecutorial policy. More significantly, discrimination can enter
the charging decision in subtle or 'unconscious' ways." (footnotes omitted)).
This unconscious racism is relevant in that it is the product of the very historical
and cultural heritage that fuels the perceptions of racial bias in prosecutorial deci-
sionmaking. Only if this decisionmaking is somehow made subject to public scrutiny
can these perceptions be either verified or dispelled. Meaningful judicial review of
prosecutorial discretion can supply this needed scrutiny. See discussion infra Part III.C.
83 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
Leading Cases, supra note 23, at 175 (arguing that the Armstrong Court placed too much
emphasis on the concern over flooding the courts with frivolous selective prosecution
claims).
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also the importance of the constitutional right sought to be pro-
tected. The Court, in the same term as Armstrong, reiterated the
paramount importance of the Constitution's guarantee of equal pro-
tection of the laws in another context. In Bush v. Vera,s6 an equal pro-
tection challenge to alleged racial gerrymandering in electoral redis-
tricting, the Court stated that "[i]f the promise of the Reconstruction
Amendments, that our Nation is to be free of state-sponsored dis-
crimination, is to be upheld, we cannot pick and choose.., in our ef-
forts to eliminate unjustified racial stereotyping by government ac-
tors."8 7 Yet the Armstrong Court did "pick and choose" to insulate
federal prosecutors from strict equal protection judicial scrutiny. As a
result, any meaningful effort to inquire into the possibility that unjus-
tified racial bias is being injected into the decision to charge was
hampered.8 The legitimate need for preserving limited prosecutorial
and judicial resources should not compromise the "promise of the
Reconstruction Amendments." Such a compromise seems to have
been made by the Armstrong Court in holding that "[t] he justifications
for a rigorous standard for the elements of a selective-prosecution
claim ... require a correspondingly rigorous standard for discovery in
aid of such a claim."8 9
The argument that virtual unchecked prosecutorial discretion is
warranted by the desire to conserve limited prosecutorial and judicial
resources and to avoid delay in criminal proceedings is weakened in
the context of the federal charging decision at issue in Armstrong.
This is especially true when considering the perceptions of unconsti-S 90
tutional racial bias present in federal crack prosecutions. This is not
to say that the availability to defendants of discovery regarding selec-
tive prosecution claims should be unfettered. A proper balance must
be fashioned between the conservation of limited resources (as well as
the other three rationales for a broad grant of prosecutorial discre-
86 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
87 ML at 1956.
88 When I say that the ArmstrongCourt has insulated federal prosecutors from strict
equal protection scrutiny, I do not mean that federal prosecutorial decisions based on
race are not subject, at least in theory, to strict scrutiny. The insulation discussed does
not stem from a different legal standard applicable to federal prosecutors, but rather
from the extreme hardship the Court's decision in Armstrong confers upon criminal
defendants trying to prove that race has entered the prosecutorial decisionmaking
process. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (discussing the evidentiary
Catch-22 created by the Armstrongdecision).
89 United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1488 (1996).
90 See supra notes 68-70, 84 and accompanying text.
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tion) 9 and the protection of important constitutional fights by estab-
lishing a standard that allows facially meritorious selective prosecu-
tion claims to benefit from the discovery process.
2. The Chilling of Law Enforcement
a. The Justyifcation
The Armstrong Court was also concerned with the chilling effect
on law enforcement that might result from subjecting a prosecutor's
92motives to constant inquiry by the courts. The argument is that
prosecutors may second-guess their charging decisions if they are
constantly scrutinized by the courts. For example, a black crack de-
fendant whose case should legitimately be brought in federal couret3
might escape the more severe federal penalties because a prosecutor
fears that a selective prosecution claim will subject her decision to
careful judicial review through discovery and other judicial mecha-
nisms. In a time when the efforts of the federal government are nec-
essary in combating the crime situation in the United States, such a
chilling of federal law enforcement is particularly troublesome. If in-
deed such a chilling effect would occur absent significant barriers to
discovery on defendants' selective prosecution claims, then the ex-
tremely broad prosecutorial discretion bestowed upon prosecutors by
the Armstrong Court would be justified.
b. The Response
There exists a legitimate concern that federal prosecutors will not
zealously enforce federal drug laws due to the fear of substantial, col-
lateral litigation resulting from selective prosecution claims. The sig-
91 See discussion infra Part II.A.2-4.
See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486 ("Examining the basis of a prosecu-
tion ... threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and
decisionmaking to outside inquiry .... " (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598,
607 (1985))).
93 Relevant to the selective prosecution issue discussed in this Comment, a prose-
cution is legitimately brought in federal court when the prosecutor's charging deci-
sion is not infected with considerations of the defendant's race. Former Solicitor
General Drew S. Days III, whose office litigated the Armstrongappeal, alluded to several
race-neutral factors that are relevant in crack prosecution charging decisions. These
include: (1) the amount of drugs involved; (2) any firearm violations intertwined with
the drug offense; (3) the strength of the overall evidence; (4) any threats made to law
enforcement officers during the arrest; and (5) the past criminal history of the defen-
dant. SeeDays, supra note 68, at 184.
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nificant barrier to proving selective prosecution created by the
Court's Armstrong decision, however, strikes an inadequate balance
between this concern and the constitutional guarantee of equal pro-
tection of the laws. If the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause "is
the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of
race," 4 mechanisms are needed so that citizens can determine, be-
yond a mere showing of disparate impact, when their constitutional
rights have been violated. The reality of the situation is that only
prosecutors possess information that would satisfy the discriminatory
purpose prong of a selective prosecution claim, yet this evidence is
undiscoverable according to Armstrong.9 The result is that defendants
are left without a realistic opportunity to inquire into whether there
exists "official conduct discriminating on the basis of race." The re-
sult is that the perceptions, if not the existence, of such discriminat-
ing official conduct are allowed to fester.
The Court has unnecessarily impeded the litigation of possible
meritorious claims of serious constitutional violations due, in part, to
a fear of the chilling effect that such claims might have on law en-
forcement.96 If a crack prosecution legitimately belongs in federal
court, a prosecutor need not fear unduly burdensome selective prose-
cution claims involving detailed discovery.97 In close cases, where the
decision to proceed in federal court rather than state court is not an
easy one, ' the threat of meaningful judicial review of the charging
decision through discovery of the factors that were involved in the de-
cisionmaking process is exactly the result desired if the constitutional
prohibition of selective prosecution is to have any force. Second-
guessing the charging decision in these close cases does not chill the
94 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
95 See supra note 50 (noting that the difficulty in obtaining evidence in an attempt
to prove discriminatory purpose is precisely the reason why there are shifting burdens
of proof in Title VII employment discrimination cases).
See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486 (explaining that the high evidentiary burden
"stems from a concern not to unnecessarily impair the performance of a core execu-
tive constitutional function").
97 For a model standard for granting discovery that provides both a meaningful
judicial check on prosecutorial discretion and a corresponding check on frivolous se-
lective prosecution claims, see discussion infra Part III.
98 The federal prosecutor, of course, does not literally decide if the state prosecu-
tor's office will proceed with a prosecution. The decision to charge federally, however,
is a de facto decision of whether to proceed in federal rather than state court. This is
because a federal charge will likely foreclose the necessity of a state prosecution,
whereas a decision not to charge federally will likely result in the initiation of state
criminal proceedings by the local district attorney's office.
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zealous enforcement of federal criminal law; it protects against
overzealous enforcement of these laws.9' A careful review of the
prosecutor's charging decision might disclose previously unrecog-
nized racial factors that were injected into the initial charging deci-
sion. If the case then proceeds to federal court and a selective prose-
cution claim is made by the defendant, the added level of review by
the court using discoverable evidence will further ensure that race is
not part of the prosecutor's decisionmaking process.
In citing the need to prevent the chilling of law enforcement as a
justification for the "significant barrier" placed before defendants
seeking discovery on selective prosecution claims, the Court has once
more struck an improper balance between a legitimate policy concern
and a constitutional right. Protecting the zealous enforcement of
federal criminal law, however, does not require unchecked prosecu-
torial discretion.
3. The Undermining of Prosecutorial Effectiveness
a. The Justifcation
A related concern expressed by proponents of broad judicial def-
erence to prosecutorial decisionmaking is the fear that close judicial
scrutiny of a prosecutor's decisions will reveal prosecutorial and law
enforcement strategies, thus undermining effective crime control.'0°
This argument, in part, assumes that the uncertainty regarding who
will be charged with federal (rather than state) crimes adds deterrent
value over and above the deterrence stemming from the criminal
prohibition itself. "Charging unpredictability can be seen, in this
99 Cf Allison Boyce, Case Note, Choosing the Forum: Prosecutorial Discretion and
Walker v. State, 46 ARK. L. REV. 985, 999 (1994) (discussing a study that revealed that a
number of prosecutors recognize that prosecutorial discretion brings with it the po-
tential for "abuse by overzealous prosecutors seeking harsh punishments" (citing
Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: A Case
Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAMEJ.L ETHICs & PUB. POL'Y 281,
290 (1991))).
Wo See, e.g., Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486 ("'Examining the basis of a prosecution ...
may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforce-
ment policy.'" (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985))); Hollon,
supra note 19, at 517 n.66 (stating that one objection to enhanced judicial scrutiny of
prosecutors' charging decisions is that: "[Pirosecutors [have a] legitimate interest in
shielding their use of charging discretion from public scrutiny. For example, where
federal prosecutors are using threshold quantities of drugs as a basis for decisions to
prosecute [federally], disclosure might problematically increase trafficking in amounts
just under the threshold.").
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view, as a way of retaining some 'unearned' deterrence that would be
lost if penalties were known and predictable." '0, Of course, this ar-
gument also assumes that criminals are rational actors who weigh all
the costs and benefits of their contemplated criminal actions, a highly
questionable and debated assumption. °0 Notwithstanding the actual
effectiveness of "unearned deterrence" programs such as Rudolph
Giuliani's "federal day,"'0 3 there certainly is a legitimate concern that
some criminals will avoid the criminal justice system altogether if
prosecutorial strategies are exposed through close judicial scrutiny of
prosecutorial discretion. The interest in keeping these prosecutorial
strategies from the public justifies broad prosecutorial discretion.
b. The Response
Providing for meaningful judicial review of prosecutorial discre-
tion through discovery procedures need not undermine prosecutorial
effectiveness. First, the "unearned deterrence"'0 4 thought to be de-
rived from the threat of more severe federal penalties for drug crimes
is based on questionable assumptions and is undesirable even if such
deterrence is obtainable. Second, any legitimate concerns over re-
vealing prosecutorial strategies during discovery related to selective
prosecution claims can be adequately addressed through judicial
safeguards.
Any theory of deterrence assumes that criminals are rational ac-
tors that assess the costs and benefits of their contemplated criminal
101 Vorenberg, supra note 22, at 1549-50. In other words, if one does not know
whether one will be prosecuted on more severe federal charges, one is less likely to
commit a crime in the first place. See id. at 1549-51 (explaining and critiquing the
theor that charging uncertainty adds deterrent value to criminal laws).
I Compare HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 41 (1968)
(arguing that the "Benthamite" model of the criminal as a pure rational calculator is
only partially accurate), with RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 164-65
(2d ed. 1977) (arguing that the model of the criminal as a rational calculator, while
apparently unrealistic, has substantial empirical support).'0sPerhaps the best example of this "unearned deterrence" was former U.S. Attor-
ney for the Southern District of NewYork, now Mayor of NewYork City, Rudolph Giul-
iani's policy of making one randomly chosen day of the week "federal day," in which
all drug offenders arrested and charged that day were prosecuted in federal court. By
keeping undisclosed what day of any week would be "federal day," Mr. Giuliani hoped
that the threat of harsher federal sentences would deter drug crimes throughout the
week by creating what he described as a "Russian-roulette effect." Beale, supra note 11,
at 1000; see also William Glaberson, Giuliani's Powerful Image Under Campaign Scrutiny,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1989, at Al (describing Mr. Giuliani's frequent references to his
"federal day" policy during his later political campaigns for Mayor of NewYork City).
104 Seesupra note 101 and accompanying text.
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acts before engaging in them.' 5 Accordingly, a potential criminal will
assess the benefits from the contemplated criminal act and weigh
them against the costs of the contemplated criminal act, which de-
pend on the severity of the punishment and the likelihood of being
caught.' 6 Uncertainty as to whether more severe federal charges will
be pursued, the argument goes, generates increased deterrence.
10 7
This argument is of questionable validity and empirical studies dem-
onstrate that, at the least, the evidence is inconclusive as to whether
the severity of punishment deters criminal behavior.'" Until better
evidence can be obtained that supports the theory that the threat of
stiffer federal sentences deters crimes in general, and drug crimes in
particular, this argument cannot justify unchecked prosecutorial dis-
cretion with its concomitant potential for constitutional violations.
Professor James Vorenberg criticizes this alleged deterrence ra-
tionale for prosecutorial discretion on another empirical ground.
Uncertainty as to whether one will be prosecuted, Professor Voren-
berg argues, may lead criminals, "many [of whom] are risk takers by
nature .... to underestimate the risk once they acquire a general im-
pression of uneven enforcement. "'0 Although Professor Vorenberg
was writing in the context of a decision whether to prosecute at all,
this argument is equally relevant to the decision whether to seek
105 See POSNER, supra note 102, at 163-64 ("The function of the criminal law, viewed
from an economic standpoint, is to impose additional costs on unlawful conduct
where the conventional damages remedy alone would be insufficient to limit that
conduct to the efficient level."); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76J. POL ECON. 169, 207-09 (1968) (arguing that the frequency of criminal
activity can be reduced by increasing the costs imposed on the activity).
See POSNER, supra note 102, at 165 ("The product of probability and severity is
the cost of crime to the risk-neutral offender.").
107 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
10s See, e.g., PACKER, supra note 102, at 41; Raymond Paternoster et al., Perceived Risk
and Social Controfr Do Sanctions Really Deter?, 17 LAW & Soc. REV. 457, 457 (1983)
("[T]he preliminary evidence suggests that the perceived risk of punishment has a de-
terrent effect, while the perceived severity of punishment does not."); Andrew von
Hirsch, Recent Trends in American Criminal Sentencing Theory, 42 MD. L. REV. 6, 19 (1983)
(arguing that the failure of empirical studies to control for other factors that affect the
crime rate besides the severity of punishment demonstrates that "[a]lthough there is
reason to believe that some penalty deters better than none, researchers are still un-
able reliably to measure the magnitude of deterrent effects [from increased penal-
ties]").
109 Vorenberg, supra note 22, at 1550. But see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 230 (4th ed. 1992) (considering the economic efficiency of subject-
ing a minority of offenders with a lower probability of apprehension and conviction to
harsher sentences, while subjecting the majority to less severe sentences for similar
conduct), cited in Beale, supra note 11, at 1003 n.104.
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stiffer federal sanctions or less severe state sentences. In other words,
the knowledge that less severe state sanctions might be sought against
her if caught will lead to a criminal's decision to proceed with her un-
lawful plan, thus decreasing the deterrent effects thought to be de-
rived from more severe federal sentences.
In addition to the questionable empirical validity of this unearned
deterrence theory, one must consider the inherent unfairness present
when criminal laws are enforced arbitrarily. The disparate sentencing
structures of the federal and state penal systems, especially in the area
of illegal drugs, coupled with the concurrent jurisdiction of criminal
law, create what one commentator has described as a "cruel lottery, in
which a small minority of the persons who commit a particular of-
fense is selected for federal prosecution and subjected to much
harsher sentences.., than persons prosecuted for parallel state of-
fenses.""0 Moreover, even absent any racial bias in the functioning of
this "cruel lottery" (an assumption that is certainly not supported by
the many who perceive such bias given available statistics),"' arbitrary
selection of certain offenders for federal prosecution is at odds with
the policy of evenhanded sentencing embodied in the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines."
2
Undermining the full deterrent effect of criminal law, however, is
not the only perceived threat to effective law enforcement that is
thought to justify unlimited prosecutorial discretion. Knowledge of
federal prosecutorial strategies may result in criminals structuring
their crimes to ensure state prosecutions and thus, less severe sen-
tences against them if caught."3 This argument does not justify such
broad prosecutorial discretion for two reasons: (1) even if criminals
do structure their crimes in such ways, this is not necessarily undesir-
able; and (2) judicial safeguards are available that can prevent disclo-
sure of law enforcement strategies that would harm criminal en-
forcement efforts.
First, advance knowledge of certain federal prosecutorial strate-
gies, such as the factors used to determine when a crime will be
prosecuted federally, may actually be a useful deterrent tool-perhaps
110 Beale, supra note 11, at 997.
I See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
12 See Beale, supra note 11, at 1003-04 (arguing that arbitrary selection of a minor-
ity of offenders for federal prosecution "is incompatible with the federal Sentencing
Guidelines regime" that is "devoted... to equalizing the sentences for offenders
whose conduct and criminal history are the same").
11 See supra note 100.
1997] MEANINGFUL REVIEW OFPROSECUTORTAL DISCRETION 1337
more useful than the "unearned deterrence" from unguided, uneven
enforcement policies such as Rudolph Giuliani's "federal day."" 4 For
example, if it is widely known that committing a drug crime with a
firearm is a factor that will lead to federal prosecution,"s a drug of-
fender may be deterred from using a firearm. Although the drug
crime is still committed, it has been committed in a more benign
manner. Such deterrence, although incomplete, is certainly a poten-
tially valuable tool for law enforcement.
Second, judicial safeguards can be utilized when law enforcement
strategies must be kept relatively confidential in order to ensure safe,
effective crime control. There can be no argument that general
knowledge of certain prosecutorial policies may indeed undermine
law enforcement efforts." 6 To the extent that such information is
necessary for meaningful judicial review of prosecutorial discretion in
the selective prosecution context, mechanisms can be utilized to en-
sure that law enforcement effectiveness is not compromised, such as
in camera review of relevant evidence and protective orders."7 Such
mechanisms are used in other analogous contexts to balance the
need for review of relevant evidence with the need for secrecy.""
A careful examination of the fear of undermining the effective-
ness of law enforcement through discovery on selective prosecution
claims reveals that virtually unchecked prosecutorial discretion repre-
sents an inadequate balance between competing policies. First, the
114 See Vorenberg, supra note 22, at 1550 ("[G]uidelines that provide advance
knowledge that committing a crime in as benign a way as possible results in relatively
lenient treatment may be valuable.").
115 See supra note 93 (noting that use of a firearm during the commission of a drug
crime is a factor that is considered when deciding to prosecute a case federally).
116 A good example of such policies are the actual crime fighting strategies of fed-
eral law enforcement officers. Knowledge of how and where federal law enforcement
agents investigate drug activity may be highly relevant in determining whether race is
entering into the decision to proceed federally with a case. Yet, advance knowledge of
such strategies not only undermines law enforcement effectiveness but endangers the
lives of law enforcement agents by potentially forewarning criminals of law enforce-
ment activity.
117 See Hollon, supra note 19, at 517 n.66 (arguing that in camera review of sensi-
tive prosecutorial material "would allow judges to address egregious misuses of charg-
ing discretion while protecting prosecutors' interests in nondisclosure").118 See, e.g., FED. RL CIV. P. 26(c) (providing for protective orders when necessary
.to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense," due to discovery requests); see also infra notes 157-58 (noting that
the risk of revelation of trade secrets is a factor a court may consider in balancing a
corporation's right to assert the attorney-client privilege against the shareholders'
rights to discovery).
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empirical evidence of added deterrence from broad prosecutorial
discretion is simply too weak to support a policy that injects into the
criminal justice system an avenue for misuse of governmental powers
as severe as a denial of equal protection of the laws. Second, as with
the rationales for prosecutorial discretion discussed above in Parts
II.A.1 & 2, the Court's "significant barrier" to discovery on selective
prosecution claims is not necessary to prevent the undermining of law
enforcement effectiveness. A more generous discovery standard, one
that not only takes into account the rationales for prosecutorial dis-
cretion, but also balances the need to protect defendants' constitu-
tional rights, is necessary and readily obtainable.
4. Separation of Powers and the Relative Competence of the
Executive and Judicial Branches Regarding
the Prosecutorial Function
a. The Justification
Perhaps the most often espoused rationale for the broad grant of
unchecked discretionary authority granted to American prosecutors
(both state and federal) is based on the constitutional principle of
separation of powers among the three branches of government. "The
separation of powers doctrine generally prevents judicial interference
with a prosecutor's broad discretion to initiate and conduct criminal
prosecutions."n 9 The D.C. Circuit in 1967 summarized this separa-
tion of powers justification for prosecutorial discretion in the broad-
est terms when it wrote:
Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the
Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute
criminal proceedings ....
... Two persons may have committed what is precisely the same legal
offense but the prosecutor is not compelled by law, duty or tradition to
treat them the same .... [N]o court has any jurisdiction to inquire into
or review his decision.
... [W]hile this discretion is subject to abuse... deviations from his
duty as an agent of the Executive are to be dealt with by his superiors.
119 James Sottile IV, ProsecutoialDiscretion, 73 GEO. LJ. 403, 403 (1984).
1997] MEANINGFUL REVIEW OFPROSECUTORAL DISCRETION 1339
... [I] t is not the function of the judiciary to review the exercise of
executive discretion whether it be that of the President himself or those
to whom he has delegated certain of his powers.
In addition to the argument that the judiciary cannot constitu-
tionally interfere with the proper role of the Executive Branch, many
courts and commentators, including the Armstrong Court, view prose-
cutors as relatively more competent than courts in making such deci-
sions as whom to bring charges against and where to bring these
charges. This is due to the fact that it is prosecutors who confront




The Constitution vests in the President the duty to "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed,"'2 2 and Congress has delegated part
of this duty, the power to enforce federal criminal laws, to the Attor-
ney General and United States Attorneys.'2 It is, therefore, the prov-
ince of the Executive Branch of government, acting through the
President, the Attorney General, and most directly, each judicial dis-
trict's United States Attorney's Office, to enforce federal criminal law.
Because the Executive Branch functions in this prosecutorial role on
a daily basis, executive officers are most competent in making the
everyday decisions necessary in enforcing federal criminal law, such as
whom to prosecute. 24 This fact however, does not support the level of
prosecutorial discretion endorsed by the Armstrong Court.
120 Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480-82 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see also United
States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486 (1996) (explaining that federal prosecutors
have broad discretion to enforce federal criminal law "because they are designated by
statute as the President's delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsi-
bility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed'" (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 3)). But see United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979) (holding that a
prosecutor's discretion is "subject to constitutional restraints" enforceable by the
courts).
121 See, e.g., Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486 ("Judicial deference to the decisions of
[federal prosecutors] rests in part on an assessment of the relative competence of
prosecutors and courts."); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (describing
common factors considered in making charging decisions as "not readily susceptible
to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake"); Reiss, supra note 81, at
1368-69 n.10 (describing the prosecutor-as-expert argument for judicial deference to
prosecutorial discretion). But see Vorenberg, supra note 22, at 1545-48 (describing and
criticizing this expertise argument for unfettered prosecutorial discretion).
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
123 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 547 (1994).
124 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
1340 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 145:1309
In supporting its view that federal prosecutors "retain 'broad dis-
cretion' to enforce the Nation's criminal laws," the Armstrong Court
was clearly concerned with infringing upon the "special province" of
the Executive Branch of government. 12 This separation of powers ar-
gument is a long-standing justification for such broad prosecutorial
discretion and was described by the Fifth Circuit in 1965 as mandat-
ing that "the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the
discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their
control over criminal prosecutions."12 6 To cloak prosecutorial discre-
tionary decisionmaking in a presumption of regularity based on the
fact that enforcement of the nation's criminal laws is the "special
province" of the Executive Branch, however, ignores the proper role
of the judicial branch within the constitutional system of checks and
balances.
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis criticizes the separation of powers
argument for prosecutorial discretion in similar, if not more power-
ful, terms:
This reason [for unchecked prosecutorial discretion] is so clearly un-
sound as to be almost absurd. If separation of powers prevents review of
discretion of executive officers, then more than a hundred Supreme
Court decisions spread over a century and three-quarters will have to be
found contrary to the Constitution! If courts could not interfere with
abuse of discretion by executive officers, our fundamental institutions
would be altogether different from what they are. If the statement just
quoted from the Fifth Circuit [in United States v. Cox] were true, the
courts would be powerless to interfere when executive officers, acting il-
legally, are about to execute an innocent person!
12
7
Because one of the functions of the courts is to review executive dis-
cretionary actions for abuse of that discretion, the rationale for a
123 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486 ("A selective-prosecution claim asks a court to ex-
ercise judicial power over a 'special province' of the Executive. The Attorney General
and the United States Attorneys retain 'broad discretion' to enforce the Nation's
criminal laws. They have this latitude because they are designated by statute as the
President's delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility [to en-
force the nation's laws]." (citations omitted)).
126 United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965).
127 DAVIS, supra note 22, at 210. For an example ofjudicial review of executive ac-
tions for abuse of discretion, one need look no further than Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886), the case that established the constitutional protection against
selective prosecution. See discussion supra Part I.A. For a full presentation of the case
law alluded to by Professor Davis in the above quotation see KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 5
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 28:1-.15 (2d ed. 1984).
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"significant barrier" to discovery in selective prosecution claims based
on a separation of powers argument is unpersuasive.
More persuasive is the argument that prosecutors should be
granted broad discretion in their decisionmaking processes due to
their relative competence compared to the courts in making decisions
such as whom and where to prosecute.'2 This argument, however
valid it might be when a court is asked to review a prosecutor's as-
sessment of "the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Gov-
ernment's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the
Government's overall enforcement plan,"'29 loses its validity when a
court is asked to review prosecutorial actions for constitutional viola-
tions, a task courts are called upon to do on a regular basis. The Arm-
strong Court, by embracing a valid justification for the doctrine of
prosecutorial discretion in other contexts, without assessing its valid-
ity in the selective prosecution context, has seriously undermined the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
B. Affirmative Responses to the Justi fications for Prosecutorial Discretion
1. The Unequivocal Constitutional Mandate of Equal Protection
The traditional rationales for granting prosecutors broad discre-
tionary powers do not justify unchecked prosecutorial discretion in
the context of the decision to prosecute federally. In large measure
this is due to their failure to balance adequately competing constitu-
tional interests. Perhaps the most persuasive reason for meaningful
judicial review of such prosecutorial discretion was alluded to by the
Court in Armstrong, although the Court did not follow the argument
to its logical conclusion. After determining that the traditional justi-
fications for broad prosecutorial discretion insulate a prosecutor's
charging decision from judicial review "'so long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense de-
fined by statute,'"' 0 the Court acknowledged that "[o]f course, a
prosecutor's discretion is 'subject to constitutional constraints.'",13
128 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (arguing that broad prose-
cutorial discretion is necessary because the decision whether to prosecute is
"particularly ill-suited to judicial review").
129 Id.
SO Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
(1978)).
131 Id. (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979)).
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The Court then proceeded to set its self-described "significant
barrier" for defendants seeking to obtain discovery on their equal
protection claims, thus subjecting prosecutorial discretion to virtually
no constitutional constraints. 3 2 This "significant barrier" was deemed
by the Court to "adequately balance[] the Government's interests in
vigorous prosecution and the defendant's interest in avoiding selec-
tive prosecution."' 3 Balancing practical governmental interests, such
as an interest in vigorous prosecution, with a defendant's constitu-
tional rights, however, has been deemed inappropriate by the Su-
preme Court in other contexts. In Payton v. New York,' 4 the Court,
determined that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from
entering a suspect's home to arrest him without first obtaining a war-
rant. The Court rejected the government's contention that such a
warrant requirement would undermine effective law enforcement"3
In addition to questioning the validity of the government's asserted
policy interests, the Court stated: "More fundamentally, however,
such arguments of policy must give way to a constitutional command
that we consider to be unequivocal." 6 Likewise, the unequivocal
constitutional command of equal protection of the laws should not be
unduly burdened by the policy interests that served as the justification
for a "substantial barrier" to selective prosecution claims in Arm-
strong.137
2. Necessity
The Armstrong Court set a high threshold for discovery partly un-
der an assumption that if Armstrong's "claim of selective prosecution
were well founded, it should not have been an insuperable task to
prove that persons of other races were being treated differently than
132 See id. at 1488 (noting that a selective prosecution claim requires a "rigorous
standard for discovery").
13 Id. at 1489.
13 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
135 The State of New York had argued that such a warrant requirement would have
a number of negative practical consequences:
lIt] will pressure police to seek warrants and make arrests too hurriedly, thus
increasing the likelihood of arresting innocent people; ... it will divert scarce
resources thereby interfering with the police's ability to do thorough investi-
gations; ... it will penalize the police for deliberate planning; and... it will
lead to more injuries.
Id. at 602 n.55.
13 Id. at 602.
137 See discussion supra Part 11.A.
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[he]."'s This statement, however, is of questionable merit. As the
Ninth Circuit expressed in affirming the district court's discovery or-
der:
(JWudges considering discovery requests on selective prosecution
charges should bear in mind the evidentiary obstacles defendants face.
The notorious difficulty of proving a race discrimination claim is par-
ticularly acute in the context of selective prosecution claims.... The
broad discretion that prosecutors possess over charging decisions means
that they alone will often possess the only information that would dem-
onstrate such discrimination.... As a result, the data necessary to a
showing of selective prosecution are far less accessible to the defendants
than to the government.139
The significant barrier to discovery on selective prosecution
claims, given the evidentiary obstacles inherent in any attempt to
prove subjective racial motivation, effectively bars the litigation of se-
lective prosecution claims on the merits. The result is that the gov-
ernment's interests in maintaining broad discretion in prosecutorial
decisionmaking is not at all balanced with a defendant's interest in
avoiding unconstitutional selective prosecution.
Instead, under the Armstrong Court's high threshold of evidence
necessary merely to obtain discovery on a selective prosecution claim,
the government's interests, some of which are admittedly legiti-
mate,40 invariably predominate over a defendant's interest in avoid-
ing selective prosecution.
C. Summary
The Armstrong Court erred in two significant ways by setting a
high threshold of evidence necessary for a defendant to obtain dis-
8 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1489. To prove that other races were treated differently,
the Court gave an example of the type of evidence that respondents could have easily
obtained. See id. ("For instance, respondents could have investigated whether similarly
situated persons of other races were prosecuted by the State of California, were known
to federal law enforcement officers, but were not prosecuted in federal court."). The
Court does not, however, explain how a defendant is to prove federal law enforcement
officers knew of a criminal violation but did not pursue the case in federal court with-
out some level of discovery.
139 United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1514 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 624 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). Illustrative of the
Ninth Circuit's argument, before being reversed by the Supreme Court, the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Armstrongwas the first reported federal case since Yick Wo in which
a defendant succeeded on her claim of racial selective prosecution. See Leading Cases,
supra note 23, at 171.
140 See discussion supra Part II.A.
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covery on a selective prosecution claim based on the common ration-
ales for prosecutorial discretion. First, the Court treated the tradi-
tional rationales for broad prosecutorial discretion as gospel without
carefully examining and balancing the policies underlying these ra-
tionales with countervailing interests, namely a defendant's right to
equal protection of the laws.14 ' Second, even after a cursory acknowl-
edgment of the important constitutional right at stake, the Court
failed to consider whether balancing the constitutional mandate of
being free from selective prosecution with practical policy considera-
tions is even appropriate in the first place. This failure is especially
relevant given the unequivocal nature of that mandate and the neces-
sity of making discovery of prosecutorial material available to criminal
defendants in order to effectuate the purposes of that mandate.
4 2
There is a need, therefore, forjudicial reevaluation of the basic prem-
ises that served as the foundation for the Court's decision in Arm-
strong, and a need for a model that will supply meaningful judicial re-
view of prosecutorial discretion.
III. THE PROSECUTOR AS FIDUCIARY: A MODEL FOR MEANINGFUL
REVIEW OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
143
Seeking a working model for meaningful review of prosecutorial
discretion requires an examination of analogous situations where liti-
gants seek discovery of otherwise unobtainable evidence. Cases where
beneficiaries of fiduciary relationships request otherwise privileged
information from the fiduciary provide such an analogy.4 4 This situa-
tion arises frequently, although certainly not exclusively, in the con-
text of corporate derivative suits where shareholders sue the directors
and officers of a corporation for mismanagement in the name of the
141 See id&
142 See discussion supra Part II.B.
143 The model for meaningful judicial review of prosecutorial discretion presented
in this Part was inspired by a discussion of to whom lawyers owe duties when con-
fronted with a client who owes fiduciary duties to a third party. See GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD, JR., ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 808 (2d ed. 1994)
(questioning whether "individuals who allege the government has violated its trust
[should be entitled] to discover communications of government lawyers upon a show-
ing of good cause").
'4See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 30-36 (detailing available discovery mechanisms for civil
litigation in federal court); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (1) ("Parties may obtain dis-
covery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant....").
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corporation.4 In this context, shareholders seek discovery of rele-
vant information pertaining to their underlying claim of corporate
mismanagement.146  Normally, this information ,would be immune
from discovery due to the attorney-client privilege because it consists
of communications between corporate officials and corporate attor-
neys that relate to the latter's representation of the former.
47
In the landmark case of Garner v. Wolfinbarger,48 however, the
Fifth Circuit fashioned an exception to the corporate attorney-client
privilege, by allowing for discovery of otherwise privileged evidence in
certain situations. 149 The final Part of this Comment first examines
the rationale of the Garner exception to the attorney-client privilege,
and demonstrates that it is based on the fiduciary relationship be-
tween corporate management and shareholders. Next, by arguing
that a prosecutor has a similar fiduciary relationship with a defendant
in a criminal case, this Comment draws an analogy between a claim of
corporate mismanagement and a claim of prosecutorial misuse of dis-
cretion resulting in unconstitutional selective prosecution. Finally,
143 In addition to the shareholder derivative suit, other notable situations where
such discovery is sought include union members suing their national unions, see, e.g.,
Nellis v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 144 F.R.D. 68 (E.D. Va. 1992), and insureds suing their
insurance companies, see e.g., A. Kush & Assocs. v. Wein Geroff Enter., Inc., No.
85C493, 1986 WL 15120, at *2 (N.D. 11. Dec. 31, 1986). See generally Robert R. Sum-
merhays, The Problematic Expansion of the Garner v. Wolfinbarger Exception to the Corpo-
rate Attorney-Client Privilege, 31 TULSA L.J. 275, 308-12 & nn.167-91 (1995) (discussing
various litigation situations where parties attempt to obtain discovery of otherwise
privileged information other than in corporate derivative litigation).
See, e.g., Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 979 F.2d 332, 341 (4th Cir. 1992)
(shareholders seeking attorney-client communications related to a corporate merger);
In Re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1238 (5th Cir.
1982) (shareholders seeking attorney-client communications related to alleged securi-
ties law violations); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1095 (5th Cir. 1970)
(shareholders seeking attorney-client communications related to an alleged fraudu-
lent issuance of stock).
147 See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at
554 (rev. 1961). Wigmore defines the requirements of the attorney-client privilege as:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal ad-
visor in his capacity as such, (3) the communication relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except
the protection be waived.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
148 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
149 Almost all federal courts have adopted the Garner exception to the corporate
attorney-client privilege. See Summerhays, supra note 145, at 287 & n.49 (noting that
the only reported federal case failing to adopt the Garner exception is Shirvani v. Capi-
tal Investing Corp., 112 F.R.D. 389, 391 (D. Conn. 1986)).
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this Part presents a model for providing meaningful judicial review of
prosecutorial discretion, drawing its essence from the Garner excep-
tion to the corporate attorney-client privilege.
A. Garner v. Wolfinbarger and Discovery of Otherwise Privileged
Information from a Fiduciary
The plaintiff-shareholders in Garner brought a shareholder class
action lawsuit and a derivative suit alleging that corporate manage-
ment violated several federal and state laws related to the issuance of
corporate stock.'  The plaintiff-shareholders alleged that, as pur-
chasers of the stock, the defendants' actions caused personal injury to
them, as well as injury to the corporation itself.'5' In their effort to
gather evidence in support of their allegations, the shareholders
sought information, both in the form of oral testimony and documen-
tary evidence, regarding legal advice that corporate counsel had given
related to the issuance of corporate stock. The corporate counsel,
who at the time of the litigation had become the corporation's presi-
dent, refused to comply with these discovery requests, asserting that
they were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The district court
ordered discovery, holding that corporate management could not as-
sert the attorney-client privilege to bar discovery of evidence relating
to the shareholders' claims of corporate mismanagement. The cor-
poration had argued that the attorney-client privilege is absolute and
protects communications between an attorney and a corporate client
that relate to the particular representation, regardless of the status of
the plaintiffs in a lawsuit.
52
The Fifth Circuit rejected these extreme positions, instead recog-
nizing "the need for balancing competing interests in disclosure and
nondisclosure."5 3 The court acknowledged the legitimate interests
corporate management has in maintaining the confidentiality of at-
torney-client communications.5 The court, however, also recognized
0 The shareholders alleged violations of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77a-77aa, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78hh-1, the In-
vestment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1-80a-52, the Alabama Securities Act, 53
AL. CODE § 28-65 (1969 Supp.), and common law fraud. See Garner, 430 F.2d at 1095.
151 See Garner, 430 F.2d at 1095. The shareholders claimed that the corporation
and its officers committed acts "injurious to their interests as stockholders" and that
the corporation "was itself damaged by alleged fraud in the purchase and sale of secu-
rities." Id.
152 See i&L at 1096.
153 Id. at 1097.
5 The court stated:
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the important interests shareholders have in ensuring that corporate
management is not abusing its discretion by mismanaging the corpo-
ration. 5s
Balancing these competing interests-(1) management's interest
in being free from constant second-guessing by dissatisfied share-
holders, and (2) shareholders' interest in protecting themselves
against corporate mismanagement-the court fashioned a "good
cause" exception to the corporate attorney-client privilege. 56 Thus, a
corporation's right to assert the attorney-client privilege against com-
plaining shareholders in litigation is subject to the right of share-
holders to show cause why the privilege should not be available in a
• . 157
particular case.
The indicia that were deemed by the court to contribute to a
showing of "good cause" tend to track the likelihood of success on the
merits of the shareholders' underlying claim.55 Thus, if an examina-
Corporate management must manage. It has the duty to do so and requires
the tools to do so. Part of the managerial task is to seek legal counsel when
desirable, and, obviously, management prefers that it confer with counsel
without the risk of having the communications revealed at the instance of one
or more dissatisfied stockholders. The managerial preference is a rational
one, because it is difficult to envision the management of any sizeable corpo-
ration pleasing all of its stockholders all at the time, and management desires
protection from those who might second-guess or even harass in matters
purely ofjudgment.
Id. at 1101.
155 The Gamer court emphasized shareholders' competing interests in this regard
by stating.
But in assessing management assertions of injury to the corporation it
must be borne in mind that management does not manage for itself and that
the beneficiaries of its action are the stockholders.... There may be many
situations in which the corporate entity or its management, or both, have in-
terests adverse to those of some or all stockholders. But when all is said and
done management is not managing for itself.... [M]anagement judgment
must stand on its merits, not behind an ironclad veil of secrecy which under
all circumstances preserves it from being questioned by those for whom it is,
at least in part, exercised.
Id.
156 See id. at 1103-04.
157 See id.
158 The indicia that the court listed as contributing to the presence or absence of
good cause were:
[T]he number of shareholders and the percentage of stock they represent;
the bona fides of the shareholders; the nature of the shareholders' claim and
whether it is obviously colorable; the apparent necessity or desirability of the
shareholders having the information and the availability of it from other
sources; whether, if the shareholders' claim is of wrongful action by the cor-
poration, it is of action criminal, or illegal but not criminal, or of doubtful le-
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tion of preliminary factors tends to demonstrate that discovery of fur-
ther evidence may prove shareholders' allegations of corporate mis-
managemeht, a judge, at her discretion, should grant discovery of
otherwise privileged attorney-client communications. This "good
cause" exception to the attorney-client privilege adequately balances
the competing interests, for it protects both against shareholder har-
assment of corporate management which could frustrate the corpo-
rate purpose, and mismanagement of corporate power, which is inju-
rious to shareholders.
Subsequent decisions applying the Garner exception to the attor-
ney-client privilege make clear that the need to balance the compet-
ing interests discussed by the court is based on the fiduciary relation-
ship that exists between corporate management and shareholders. In
Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc.,'-9 the court distinguished the facts of Garnerbut
followed its reasoning in favor of disclosure.' 6° Valente involved a suit
by minority shareholders against majority shareholders for federal se-
curities laws violations.16' In ordering the disclosure of the informa-
tion, the court stated that "[a] fiduciary owes the obligation to his
beneficiaries to go about his duties without obscuring his reasons
from the legitimate inquiries of the beneficiaries. "I62 The court in
Quintel Corp., N. V. v. Citibank, N.A., '63 summarized the Garner holding
as follows:
The Garner rule stems not only from the general proposition that a
beneficiary is entitled to know how the authority he has granted has
been exercised but on the recognition that because of the mutuality of
interest between the parties, the faithful fiduciary has nothing to hide
from his beneficiary.
gality; ... the extent to which the communication is identified versus the ex-
tent to which the shareholders are blindly fishing; and the risk of revelation
of trade secrets or other information in whose confidentiality the corporation
has an interest for independent reasons. The court can freely use in camera
inspection or oral examination and freely avail itself of protective orders, a
familiar device to preserve confidentiality in trade secret and other cases
where the impact of revelation may be as great as in revealing a communica-
tion with counsel.
Rd at 1104.
159 68 FR.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975).
160 See id. at 370.
161 See id. at 363.
162 Md at 370.
163 567 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
'rA IR at 1363.
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Thus, Garner stands for the proposition that information other-
wise free from disclosure may be discoverable when a fiduciary rela-
tionship exists between the parties.'6 5 The likelihood that the benefi-
ciary's underlying claim against the fiduciary is meritorious, and the
need for disclosure from the fiduciary to prove this claim, must be
weighed, on a case-by-case basis, against the fiduciary's legitimate in-
terests in nondisclosure.'6 6
Implicit in this "good cause" exception allowing discovery of oth-
erwise privileged information is the recognition that, without such
discovery, a significant barrier is placed before a beneficiary attempt-
ing to prove a breach of a fiduciary relationship. Discovery, therefore,
is sometimes necessary to protect beneficiaries from a fiduciary's
abuse of her discretionary powers over the beneficiary. In other
words, discovery is needed to enforce rights and obligations that, in
the absence of discovery, would probably go unenforced.
B. The Application ofGarner to a Defendant's Claim of Selective Prosecution
1. Prosecutors and Defendants in Fiduciary Relationships
A prosecutor, like all lawyers, is in a fiduciary relationship with
her clients. 67 This relationship is one of principal and agent, where
the client-principal is the beneficiary of the lawyer-agent's conduct.
In the prototypical attorney-client relationship, it is clear to whom the
attorney owes fiduciary duties."" A prosecutor, however, is not a party
to a normal attorney-client relationship; prosecutors represent the
163 See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text; see also Sandberg v. Virginia
Bankshares, Inc., 979 F.2d 332, 354 (4th Cir. 1992) ("We believe the attorney/client
privilege should not be used to shield the communications at the April 20 meeting
[the evidence sought by plaintiff-shareholders] from discovery by the very persons for
whom the meeting participants were acting as fiduciaries." (emphasis added)); Fausek
v. White, 965 F.2d 126, 131 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting with approval the corporation's
assertion that the Garner rule "stresses 'a requirement of a fiduciary relationship be-
tween the parties seeking discovery and the parties resisting compelled [disclosure of]
privileged communications'").
166 See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 143, at 472 (describing the fiduciary model of the
lawyer-client relationship and noting that under this model "courts... look to agency
and fiduciary principles to resolve [any] conflict[s]").
168 The full extent of these fiduciary duties is beyond the scope of this Comment
but is summarized by the following quotation: "Lawyers' paramount duties are to their
clients: attorneys must pursue client interests zealously, remain loyal at all times, and
maintain client secrets." Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial
Practice: CanProsectorsDoJustice, 44 VAND. L. REV 45, 53 (1991) (citations omitted).
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government, but the government, in turn, represents the public in-
terest. Following this logic to its ultimate conclusion, one can argue
that a prosecutor's clientele is comprised of all the People, including
the very defendant she is prosecuting in a particular case:
The prosecutor... enters a courtroom to speak for the People and not
just some of the People. The prosecutor speaks not solely for the victim,
or the police, or those who support them, but for all the People. The
body of "The People" includes the defendant and his family and those who care
about him. It also includes the vast majority of citizens who know noth-
ing about a particular case, but who give over to the prosecutor the
authority to seek ajust result in their name.
One need not, however, take the extreme position that the de-
fendant in the case the prosecutor is trying is part of her clientele.
Such a conclusion would present peculiar doctrinal difficulties when
a prosecutor is justifiably seeking conviction of a defendant.' 70 Even if
a prosecutor ceases to represent a defendant once charges are
brought, a prosecutor and a defendant are not typical antagonists in
the adversarial system. Unlike in civil litigation where an attorney's
function is to seek the best result for her client within the bounds of




19 Carol A. Corrigan, On Prosecutorial Ethics, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 537, 538-39
(1986) (emphasis added); Robert P. Lawry, Confidences and the Government Lawyer, 57
N.C. L. REV. 625, 637 (1978) (arguing that a government lawyer works for the public
interest and, therefore, must consider her clientele to consist of the public at large);
see also Alan B. Morrison, Defending the Government: How Vigorous Is Too Vigorous?, in
VERDICTS ON LAWYERS 242, 249 (Ralph Nader & Mark Green eds., 1976) (noting that
even if a government lawyer loses a particular case "their true client [in the lawsuit],
thepublic, may win becausejustice is done" (emphasis added)).
For example, the possibility and/or advisability of prosecutorial loyalty to de-
fendants in the midst of criminal proceedings is at least questionable, if not highly
suspect.
The Supreme Court recognized this peculiar duty of prosecutors within the ad-
versary system in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (stating that a prosecu-
tor's interest, as a representative of the government, "is not [to] ... win a case, but [to
ensure] thatjustice shall be done"). The Court elaborated on the balancing in which
a prosecutor must engage between seeking a conviction and protecting the rights of
the accused:
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as
much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about ajust
one.
Id; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. 1 (1995) ("A prose-
cutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advo-
cate."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1983) (stating that a
1997] MEANINGFUL REVIEW OFPROSECUTORJAL DISCRETION 1351
Thus, regardless of whether a defendant is considered part of a
prosecutor's clientele, there are duties that prosecutors owe defen-
dants as members of the public at large.'7 "As a representative of all
citizens, the government lawyer actually owes a duty to the opposing
party, who is a citizen and a taxpayer and who seeks protection under
a law that the government lawyer is committed to uphold."17 At a
minimum, therefore, prosecutors have duties that are enforceable by
defendants, duties which normally do not extend to opposing coun-
sel. These duties arise because prosecutors act for the benefit of the
public as fiduciaries of the public interest. 74 For, although prosecu-
tors retain broad discretion in their capacity as prosecutors, they are
"not at liberty to strike foul" blows.' 75 Defendants, thus, have a right
prosecutor's role in the adversarial system "differs from that of the usual advocate; his
duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict"); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS'
ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 85 (1975) (stating that because the government seeks
justice, not convictions, "the government wins its point even when a not-guilty verdict
is returned").
172 For a discussion regarding who is the client of a government lawyer, see Beth
Nolan, Removing Conflicts from the Administration ofJustice: Conflicts of Interest and Inde-
pendent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act, 79 GEO. L.J. 1, 33-43 (1990). Profes-
sor Nolan argues that identifying the client as the government lawyer's particular
agency most adequately describes the government lawyer's duties. See id. at 41-42.
Professor Nolan admits that this model "is incomplete, however, if it means that the
[government] lawyer's ultimate loyalty is only to the agency. The government lawyer
has obligations to the public interest as well as to the mission of her agency." Id. at 42.
Thus, even if a federal prosecutor's client is narrowly defined as the Department of
Justice (or even more narrowly defined as her local U.S. Attorney's Office), her duties
do not solely extend to her particular government agency, but also to the public at
large.
CatherineJ. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Gov-
ernmentLauyer The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951,981 (1991).
174 The California Court of Appeals described this fiduciary relationship in terms
of the agency relationship that defines the attorney-client relationship:
[it is true that a public prosecutor, as representative of the People, must sat-
isfy additional standards of conduct by reason of his position as the officer
who possesses the power and authority to speak for the State. In practical ef-
fect the public prosecutor functions in a dual capacity-as both agent and
principal, as both attorney and client. Because he exercises a dual function,
the prosecutor possesses additional responsibilities and becomes subject to
broader duties than does defense counsel, who only exercises the one func-
tion of agent-attorney.
People v. Kelley, 142 Cal. Rptr. 457, 466 (Ct. App. 1977).
17 Berger, 295 U.S. at 88. The dichotomy between the broad discretion granted to
prosecutors and the duty "not to strike foul blows" is precisely the dichotomy the Gar-
ner court was concerned with in fashioning the "good cause" exception to the corpo-
rate attorney-client privilege. See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103-04 (5th
Cir. 1970). A prosecutor needs sufficient discretion in order to "prosecute with ear-
nestness and vigor," Berger, 295 U.S. at 88,just like corporate management needs suffi-
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to be free from improper use of prosecutorial power; and where there
is a right there is necessarily a remedy. Moreover, no right is more
fundamental-and in need of a remedy-than a breach of the consti-
tutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
2. The Corporate Mismanagement Analogy
It is clear that a defendant has a right to be free from overzealous
prosecution that amounts to what the Supreme Court has described
as "foul [blows] . Moreover, the Court has acknowledged that se-
lecting a person for prosecution based on impermissible criteria, such
as race, amounts to a "foul blow," as it is a violation of the basic consti-
tutional right of equal protection of the laws."" Without evidence
pertaining to a claim of selective prosecution, which is virtually unob-
tainable without conducting discovery,'79 however, a defendant is left
with a constitutional right which lacks a realistic remedy. This is be-
cause evidence of discriminatory motive is necessary in order to show
unconstitutional selective prosecution. '8
The Garner court confronted a similar situation in the context of a
claim of corporate mismanagement. Attorney-client communica-
cient discretion to carry out its obligations. See Garner, 430 F.2d at 1101 ("Corporate
management must manage. It has the duty to do so and requires the tools to do so.").
Yet in both situations there exist opposing interests that limit prosecutors' and man-
agements' discretion respectively. In the case of a prosecutor, it is the fact that "[her]
duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict," that limits her discretion by placing af-
firmative duties on her with respect to a defendant. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88. In the
case of corporate management, it is the fact that "it must be borne in mind that man-
agement does not manage for itself[,) ... [its] beneficiaries... are the stockholders,"
that limits management discretion by placing affirmative duties on it with respect to
shareholders. Garner, 430 F.2d at 1101. Therefore, Garner supplies a working model
for balancing the competing interests present in a situation such as in Armtrongwhere
the defendant believes a prosecutor has struck a foul blow by deciding to prosecute
her in federal court rather than leaving prosecution to the state system and its less se-
vere penalties. For a more detailed explanation of the analogy between prosecutorial
misconduct and corporate mismanagement, see discussion infra Part III.B.2.
176 SeeMarburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803) ("[W]here a specific
duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that
duty, it seems ... clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to
resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.").
77 Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
178 See discussion supra Part IA-B.
17 See supra text accompanying notes 139-40 (demonstrating that evidentiary ob-
stacles render a selective prosecution claim virtually unprovable absent discovery be-
cause the necessary evidence in proving selective prosecution is invariably in the pos-
session of prosecutors).
180 See discussion supra Part I.B.
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tions, if discoverable, would have enabled a judge or jury to review
meaningfully management's actions for abuse. Absent such discov-
ery, management's decisions would have remained fully protected.
But in order for shareholders to be able realistically to enforce their
rights, the Garner court felt it was necessary, when "good cause" was
shown, not to allow such vital evidence to remain "behind an ironclad
veil of secrecy which under all circumstances preserves it from being
questioned by those for whom it is, at least in part, exercised."'81 This
right to discovery, the court acknowledged, must be tempered by
management's legitimate interest in "protection from those who
might second-guess or even harass in matters purely of [managerial]
judgment." "'
Armstrong's efforts to obtain discovery of relevant information
pertaining to his selective prosecution claim is analogous to the Gar-
ner situation. Armstrong had to prove discriminatory motive on the
part of federal prosecutors in order to show that his selection for fed-
eral prosecution violated the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment. Realistically, to be able to enforce this constitutional
guarantee, discovery of evidence in the sole possession of federal
prosecutors would be necessary.' Moreover, federal prosecutors act
in the public interest, and the public, including the defendant, has a
paramount interest in making certain that prosecutors are not abus-
ing the enormous power they wield. 8 4 Prosecutorial judgment, like
corporate management judgment should "stand on its merits, not
behind an ironclad veil of secrecy which under all circumstances pre-
serves it from being questioned by those for whom it is, at least in
part, exercised."8 5
Like the Garner court acknowledged in the corporate misman-
agement context, however, the interests to be protected by discovery
must be balanced with a prosecutor's interest in nondisclosure. 86 Just
as "[c]orporate management must manage,"8 7 prosecutors must
prosecute. Therefore, prosecutors' legitimate desire to be protected
against defendants who are likely to "second-guess or even harass"'83
8 Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970).
182 Id-
1 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
184 Seesupra note 72 and accompanying text.
18 Garner, 430 F.2d at 1101.
186 See discussion supra Part IIA
187 Garner, 430 F.2d at 1101.
188 Id.
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them on matters legitimately within prosecutorial discretion, demon-
strates a need to temper freely granted discovery with ironclad veils of189
secrecy. Had the Court in Armstrong adequately addressed the dis-
covery issue by balancing the competing interests of defendants, who
seek to protect their equal protection rights, with those of prosecu-
tors, who seek to effectively enforce federal criminal law, it would
have established a "good cause" exception to the doctrine of prosecu-
torial discretion. This exception would have been similar to the
"good cause" exception to the attorney-client privilege fashioned by
the Garner court. Yet the Armstrong Court did not adequately balance
the analogous interests balanced by the court in Garner;, rather the
Court preserved an ironclad veil of secrecy by setting a "significant
barrier" before defendants seeking discovery on selective prosecution
claims."9
C. A "Good Cause"Exception to Prosecutorial Discretion and
the Federal Charging Decision
The Garner court listed several factors that a court should con-
sider in determining whether shareholders had shown the "good
cause" required to overcome the attorney-client privilege in a specific
case.'9 ' These factors can be divided into three categories: (1) statis-
tical indicia of the merits of the shareholders' underlying claim;'9 (2)
the relative importance of the right asserted to have been breached
by management in the litgation; 3 and (3) affirmative reasons for
nondisclosure.'9 Each of these categories can guide a court in de-
termining whether discovery should be granted relating to an analo-
gous claim of selective prosecution in the federal charging decision.
These factors are not meant to be an exhaustive list of the relevant
indicia of good cause. They are merely meant to guide judges in de-
termining, at a very preliminary stage of a selective prosecution claim,
whether the claim is clearly frivolous or has the requisite merit to war-
189 See id.
19 SeeUnited States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486 (1996).
191 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
W This category includes the number of shareholders involved as plaintiffs in the
litigation along with the percentage of stock they represent. See id.'93
This category relates to whether the underlying claim asserts management en-
gaged in criminal activity, illegal but not criminal activity, or activity of doubtful legal-
ity. See id.
19 This category includes the fear of revealing any trade secrets through discovery.
See id.
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rant further discovery. The final determination of good cause should
be made by the district judge acting within her discretion to order
discovery and should only be reversed if the judge has abused this
discretion.'9 s
1. Statistical Indicia of Racial Bias
The national statistical data showing extreme discriminatory im-
pact of federal crack criminal enforcement is stark and troublesome
in two senses. First, most defendants in federal crack cases are black,
and second, the correspondingly disproportionate number of white
crack offenders being prosecuted in state court are subject to more
lenient penalties.'9X Of course, these national data do not necessarily
correspond to the statistics in each district, and therefore this factor
will not automatically support a discovery request relating to a selec-
tive prosecution claim in all judicial districts. What is important,
nonetheless, is that defendants can obtain these statistics absent dis-
covery; and at the least, these data call into question the motivations
of the particular district's U.S. Attorney's Office in making its federal
charging decisions.9 7 Consequently, the statistics strengthen defen-
dants' claims for further discovery related to federal prosecutors'
charging criteria that would either prove race-based selective prosecu-
tion or vindicate the constitutionality of the prosecutor's charging de-
cision.
Other easily obtainable threshold statistical data that would be
relevant to a court's determination of whether there is good cause to
195 Cf United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1492 (1996) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit's decision upholding the district court's dis-
covery order was correct because the district judge had not abused her discretion in
ordering discovery despite the fact thatJustice Stevens would not have ordered discov-
ery if he had been the districtjudge in Armstrong (citing United States v. Armstrong, 48
F.3d 1508, 1520-21 (9th Cir. 1995) (Wallace, C.J., concurring) (stating that the appli-
cable standard of review when reviewing a district court's discovery ruling is abuse of
discretion))).
19 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. The data concerning the racial
makeup of crack offenders being prosecuted in state court is very preliminary due in
large part to the failure of most states to distinguish between crack-cocaine and pow-
der cocaine, as the federal system does. See Days, supra note 68, at 188-89 (noting that
only three states were able to provide the U.S. Sentencing Commission with the racial
makeup of defendants in state crack prosecutions because of the failure of most states
to make the crack/powder cocaine distinction and arguing that a 50-state study is
needed).
197 See supra notes 59, 69-70 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Arm-
strong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1513 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that statistical disparities alone may
establish a prima facie case of selective prosecution).
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grant discovery on a defendant's selective prosecution claim involve
the particular facts of the case before the court. For example, a drug
prosecution involving a federal law enforcement investigation, a re-
peat offender, a large quantity of drugs, multiple sales, or a firearm
would tend to support the government's assertion that the case was
being brought federally for race-neutral reasons. When such aggra-
vating circumstances are present, federal prosecution provides for
added punitive and deterrent effects.
198
2. Importance of the Right Being Asserted
Equal protection of the laws has been a fundamental right pro-
tected by the Constitution since Reconstruction.9 Moreover, the
right to be free from selective enforcement of a facially neutral statute
based on race was recognized to be within the ambit of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause over a century ago in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.sm A criminal
defendant's right to protection against racially discriminatory initia-
tion of proceedings that will potentially take away her liberty is as im-
portant a right as any guaranteed by the Constitution.2 "' This does
not, however, mean that this second category of indicia of good cause
will always support granting discovery. The injury in an Armstrong-like
situation is not that the defendant is being prosecuted at all, but that
198 Interestingly, all these factors would tend to support the government's conten-
tion in Armstrong that the federal charging decision was not motivated by race, despite
the statistics showing disproportionate racial impact of federal charging decisions in
the Central District of California. See Days, supra note 68, at 184 (noting that the Arm-
strong case involved more than twice the quantity of crack necessary for mandatory ten-
year sentences under federal law, due to multiple sales indicating a large crack distri-
bution ring, multiple federal firearm violations, and criminal histories for some of the
defendants); see also Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1483 (including with these facts that fed-
eral law enforcement agencies as well as local police were involved in the arrest of the
defendants). These facts suggest that perhaps Armstrongwas a fairly weak case factually
to come before the Supreme Court on such an important issue. See id. at 1492
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that Armstrong's "showing was not
strong enough to give [him] a right to discovery," but arguing that the "DistrictJudge
did not abuse her discretion when she concluded that the factual showing was suffi-
ciently disturbing to require some response from the United States Attorney's Of-
fice"); cf. Kirk A. Kennedy, Thurgood Marshall's Enduring Legacy: A Prescription for the
1990s Public Interest Lauyer, 38 How. L.J. 383, 397-401 (1995) (reviewing MARK V.
TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME
COURT, 1936-1961 (1994), and noting the importance Thurgood Marshall placed on
finding sympathetic plaintiffs in his litigation campaign to abolish de jure segrega-
tion).
19 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
200 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886); see also discussion supra Part I.A.
201 See supra note 87 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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she is being prosecuted in federal court subject to more severe fed-
eral penalties. The level of the disparity in sentences that exists be-
tween the federal and state system depends on a number of factors,
most notably the applicable state law. The less disparity there is be-
tween the applicable federal sentencing range and the applicable
state sentencing range, the less likely it is that prosecutors are decid-
ing to proceed federally based on race. Moreover, as noted above,
the existence of more severe federal penalties might be a race-neutral
reason in and of itself for proceeding federally. Therefore, a court
should not consider the importance of the right at stake in isolation
from the facts of the particular case.
3. Affirmative Reasons for Nondisclosure
To preserve maximum effectiveness in law enforcement's efforts
to combat the drug problem in this nation, a U.S. Attorney's Office
has a strong interest in maintaining the confidentiality of certain in-
formation.2  As the Garner court stated in addressing the analogous
need for confidentiality of such corporate information as trade se-
crets, if ajudge is concerned with the negative effects that public dis-
closure of certain prosecutorial material may have on law enforce-
ment efforts, the court can order in camera inspection of relevant
information with accompanying protective orders to ensure secrecy.203
If the judge, acting in her discretion, believes such mechanisms would
not adequately protect law enforcement effectiveness, this factor
would support denying a discovery request.
A set barrier prohibiting discovery on the federal charging deci-
sion in the context of a selective prosecution claim does not balance
the competing interests present. What is needed is a model for the
trial judge to follow so that these competing interests will be balanced
on a district-by-district, case-by-case basis. The balancing model estab-
lished by the Fifth Circuit in Garner is exactly such a model. Given
the analogous policies discussed in Garner, that court's balancing test
is similarly appropriate for courts to use in determining whether dis-
covery is appropriate in Armstron-like claims of selective prosecution
in the federal charging decision.
= See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
03 See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1104 (5th Cir. 1970); see also supra
note 117 and accompanying text.
1358 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 145:1309
CONCLUSION
"Federal prosecutors are respected members of a respected pro-
fession. Despite an occasional misstep, the excellence of their work
abundantly justifies the presumption that 'they have properly dis-
charged their official duties.'"2 Justice Stevens, however, continued
in his Armstrong dissent by recognizing that "[n]evertheless, the possi-
bility that political or racial animosity may infect a decision to institute
criminal proceedings cannot be ignored."20 5 It is this possibility that
the Court in Armstrong ignored, and has been the focus of this Com-
ment. Unlike prior selective prosecution cases that have been de-
cided by the Supreme Court,2 5 Armstrong dealt only with the possibility
of selective prosecution in the case before the Court, not the reality of
selective prosecution in the particular case. Yet by injecting the rig-
orous standard necessary to prove selective prosecution into the stan-
dard necessary to obtain evidence of selective prosecution, the Court
has effectively shut the courthouse door to defendants claiming un-
constitutional selective prosecution, especially in an area of particular
concern, namely, federal crack prosecutions. The Armstrong decision
leaves defendants attempting to prove selective prosecution in an evi-
dentiary Catch-22 that effectively removes from the Constitution a ma-
jor component of equal protection. Until a model is established that
provides for meaningful judicial review of prosecutorial discretion in
the selective prosecution context, as the fiduciary model does, per-
haps it will take "[a] nother hundred years. . before a defendant
demonstrates to the Court's satisfaction that race played a role in his
prosecution. Given our country's history, however, it seems unlikely
that race will not influence any prosecutions in that time."
2 0 7
204 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1492 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 15 (1926)).
0 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).
% See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.
448 (1962);Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
07 Leading Cases, supra note 23, at 174.
